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THERAPISTS' LIABILITY TO THE FALSELY ACCUSED FOR
INDUCING ILLUSORY MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD
SEXUAL ABUSE-CURRENT REMEDIES AND A PROPOSED
STATUTE
JOEL JAY FINER'
A father hired a private investigator after his [adult] daughter
reportedly uncovered a repressed memory and accused him of incest.
The investigator [visited] the therapist complaining [of] nightmares
and trouble sleeping. On the third visit, the therapist told [her] that she was
an incest survivor. 'She [said] I could not remember because my brain had
blocked the memory that was too painful to deal with.'
She read the list of symptoms of incest survivors, [shook] her head
yes as if this was confirmation of her diagnosis. She recommended
incest survivor groups. In the fourth session, the diagnosis of probable incest
victim was confirmed [based on] "classic symptoms" of body memory and
sleep disorders. When [I claimed] no memory of such events, the therapist
assured me that this was often the case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
No issue in law and psychiatry has engendered such controversy as the
current debate over whether experiences of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) are
subject to repression for decades and eventually "recoverable" in therapy long
after the event.3 One principal legal issue has been whether such "recovery"
justifies the application of the "recent discovery" basis for tolling the statute of
limitations, an issue which becomes significant when an adult psychotherapy
patient sues her ostensible molester (often her father or other family member).
When these actions first reached the courts, many jurisdictions accepted the
claim that the experience of childhood sexual victimization was subject to
repression and subsequently recoverable in reliable detail decades later. Soon
after these suits were entertained, highly credentialed and widely respected
scholars and researchers questioned certain premises of the repressed
memory/recovered memory school. Some questions that have been raised are:
a) whether there is a process of repression that removes early traumatic
experiences from conscious awareness; b) whether the experiences remain
relatively intact in the untapped repressed memory or are subject to
unconscious revision and distortion over the years (confabulation); and c)
whether such memories can be recovered years later in therapy or, on the other
3 See Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of
Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129 (1993); R. Christopher Yingling, Note, The Ohio Supreme Court
Sets the Statute of Limitations and Adopts the Discovery Rule for Childhood Sexual Abuse
Actions: Now It Is Time for Legislative Action! 43 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 499 (1995); Norrie
Clevenger, Note, Statute of Limitations: Childhood Victims of Sexual Abuse Bringing Civil
Actions Against Their Perpetrators After Attaining the Age of Majority 30 J. FAM. L. 447
(1991/1992); Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute ofLimitationsforAdult Survivors
of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REV. 355 (1991); Jorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala,
Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood
Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We Gone Too Far? 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1239 (1996).
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hand, the suggestive techniques used in some therapies are likely to create
illusory memories of CSA.
In view of the emerging scholarly questions, courts have begun to push the
pendulum in the other direction, and are increasingly declining to accept
recovered memory claims as a basis of tolling statutes of limitations. 4
Legal actions have also been brought against therapists by persons accused
of child molesting by adult patients.5 These suits have challenged the concept
of repression, contending that the therapist, by use of hypersuggestive
techniques such as hypnosis and guided imagery, induced pseudomemories
of childhood abuse in the minds of the accusing patients.
While sexual abuse of children has always been a real and horrific
phenomenon 6 (a fact unrecognized until relatively recently), the issue this Article
will explore is whether, and under what circumstances, a person wrongly accused has,
or should have, one or more causes of action against a therapist for culpably inducing
the pseudomemory.7 To refine and make more rational legal actions by persons
falsely accused of childhood sexual molestation (arguably justified under
existing legal doctrine), this Article will propose specific legislation authorizing
a lawsuit under codified circumstances and conditions.
The recommended statutory provisions authorize a lawsuit where gross and
irresponsibly hypersuggestive techniques and verbalizations are utilized by a therapist;
techniques that create substantial risks of inducing specious memories and false
accusations of odious sexual crimes purportedly committed by the plaintiff. Liability
would not be imposed for ordinary negligence. Nor would itbe imposed where
the patient presented with some memories of CSA. Certain screening devices
are proposed to prevent a non-meritorious suit going forward even to pre-trial
discovery stages. Additional devices including in-camera examination of
materials are designed to protect the privilege of confidentiality to the extent
appropriate. Finally, in any suit by a person claiming to be falsely accused, the
therapist may prevail, not only if the plaintiff fails to prove the charges, but also
if the therapist can establish that the plaintiff was indeed culpable of CSA.
4See infra notes 8-40 and accompanying text.
5See infra notes 41-78 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
7 0n the subject of suits by falsely accused plaintiffs, see Cynthia Grant Bowman &
Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy,
109 HARv. L. REV. 549 (1996); Shelia F. Rock, Note, A Claim for Third Party Standing in
Malpractice Cases Involving Repressed Memory Syndrome, 37 WM & MARY L. REV. 337
(1995); Rola J. Yamini, Note, Repressed and Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse: The
Accused as "Direct Victim," 47 HASTINGS L.J. 551 (1996);Jeffrey A. Mullins, Note, Has Time
Rewritten Every Line?: Recovered-Memory Therapy and the Potential Expansion of
Psychotherapist Liability 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 (1996).
For fine treatments of the law relating to the subject of "repressed memories" and
recovered memories" see, e.g., Shelia Taub, The Legal Treatment of Recovered Memories of
Child Sexual Abuse, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 183 (1996); Julie M. Kosmond Murray, Comment,
Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of
Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual Abuse Trials, 66 U. CoLo. L. REV. 477 (1995).
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It is important to note at the start, that applying the recommended remedial
principles (principles of justice for a wrongly accused person and a shattered
family) should have very little, if any, effect on the very important work of
providing treatment for actual victims of childhood incest. The vast majority of
victims either have always realized that they were victims or at least have
fragmentary memories of sexual victimization when they enter therapy. Where
the accusing patient is in one of those categories from the start of therapy, no
lawsuit is authorized against the therapist under the principles and rules set
out below.
II. RECOVERED MEMORY: CURRENT LMGATION
A. Suits by Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse
As noted above, in recent years, courts have permitted lawsuits claiming
CSA to bebrought years after the occurrence of the alleged abuse. The threshold
issue has been whether to treat the statute of limitations as having run or as
having been tolled during a period where the experience of abusive behavior
was "repressed" in the memory. A number of courts permitting such suits have
utilized the "delayed discovery" exception to the statute of limitations. Such
courts hold that, since the plaintiff did not discover her injury8 until she
recovered her memory, often in the course of psychotherapy, the statute of
limitation did not begin to run until such recovery.9
Courts permitting actions on the theory of discovery analogize to the
"delayed discovery" rule as it operates in medical malpractice, product liability,
and like cases. A patient who was unaware that sponges were left in his body
cavity during surgery fifteen years earlier, and learns of it for the first time
during present surgery, is not barred by the statute of limitations. So, too, it is
said that the patient in therapy had no awareness of the child abuse until the
repressed memory emerged in therapy Often, these repressed memories osten-
8Throughout this Article the female pronoun will be used to refer to the patient.
This usage reflects both the facts that the considerable majority of sexually abused
children and of patients electing psychotherapy are female. The gender designation of
the therapist will vary.
9See, e.g., Hewczuk v. Sambor, 803 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Hoult v. Hoult, 792 F. Supp. 143, 145 (D. Mass. 1992) (applying
Massachusetts law); Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. 111. 1988) (issue
of fact as to when plaintiff knew or should have known) (applying Illinois law); Evans
v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (suit against foster parent); Farris
v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 52 (D.C. App. 1994) (suit by adult sisters against brother);
Phillips v. Johnson, 599 N.E.2d 4, 7 (111. Ct. App. 1992)(suit by niece against uncle); Doe
v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362,364 (Iowa 1994); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57 (Mo.
1995) (enbanc); McCollumv. D'Arcy, 638A.2d 797,799 (N.H. 1994)(suitby fifty-year-old
plaintiff against parents); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Ault v. Jasko,
637 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ohio 1994).
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sibly come to light during hypnosis or when other suggestive techniques are
employed which create a substantial risk of inducing "false memories."i 0
Over half of the states have enacted or amended legislation since the mid
1980s, addressing, and usually lengthening, statutes of limitations, as well as
dealing with other issues regarding CSA claims.11 The latest wave of legislation
tends to embody provisions designed to protect against frivolous or fraudulent
claims, provisions for example, requiring corroboration, 12 pre-trial certificates
of merit,13 and at least preliminary shielding of the identity of the accused
defendant. 14
As the number of CSA suits multiplied, and as scholars and researchers gave
some of the issues their attention, books were published warning of the dangers
of accepting "repressed" memory claims.15 The significant concerns were: a)
10The use of the term "false memories" is not meant to impugn the integrity of the
patient. Because of the power of certain suggestive techniques, such as hypnosis, the
patient is completely convinced of the veracity of the memory. False memories may be
considered "honest lies."
Sometimes the perceived memories come to consciousness outside or prior to
therapeutic involvement, a situation which does not implicate the issues addressed
herein.
1 1 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie Supp.
1995); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-80-103.7 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577d (West 1991); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-33.1 (Michie Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 513-202.2
(Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-523 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAW
ANN. ch. 260, § 4C (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1996);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046 (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1995);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:61 B-1 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 37-1-30, as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1995 N.M. LAWS 626; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51
(Michie Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-25 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-25.1 (Michie Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (Michie Supp. 1995); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West
Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105(b) (Michie Supp. 1995).
12 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103.7; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30(A)(2)
(claim mustbe corroborated by "competent medical or psychological testimony"); OKLA.
STAT. Am. tit. 12, § 95(6) (requiring "objective verifiable evidence [that] should include
both proof that the victim had psychologically repressed the memory of the facts upon
which that claim was predicated and that there was corroborating evidence that the
sexual abuse ... actually occurred").
13 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
14 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(k)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
15The works include: ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF
REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1994);
MICHAEL D. YAPKO, SUGGESTIONS OF ABUSE: TRUE AND FALSE MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD
SEXUAL TRAUMA (1994); RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE
MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA (1994); see also LAWRENCE WRIGHT,
REMEMBERING SATAN (1995).
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the uncertainty regarding the phenomenon of repression; and b) the extremely
suggestive techniques utilized by some incest survivor therapists. The scholars
expressed considerable worry that apparent memories of abuse could be false
or illusory.
As doubts were expressed about the authenticity and reliability of "recovered
memories" of CSA, and as earlier and recent research came to judicial attention,
courts increasing expressed concerns about reliability, and began requiring
corroborating evidence, 16 and admitting expert testimony.17
Courts and individual judges have been more explicitly questioning the
reliability of claims of "recovered memory."' 8 For example, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals observed:
we find that there is simply too much indecision in the scientific
community as to the credibility of repressed memory. In general,
psychologists have not come to an agreement as to whether repressed
memories may be accurately recalled or whether they may be recalled
at all. Therefore, it goes without saying that the judiciary does not have
the resources needed to make an accurate ruling on the validity of a
psychological theory about which professionals in the field disagree.
Also, there is considerable doubt about the reliability of memories that are
recalled with the assistance of a therapist or psychoanalyst.19
In a dissent to a decision holding that the statute of limitations was tolled
where memory was "repressed" and later "recovered," Justice Wright of the
Ohio Supreme Court argued, after perusing the literature, that
the methods used by psychologists and psychoanalysts to retrieve repressed
memories are unreliable and are not sufficiently established to have
gained a general acceptance in the fields of either forensic or clinical
psychology....
16See Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); see also Olsen v.
Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993)(expressing concern that the methods used to revive
the memories "may induce memories of events that never happened"); Petersen v.
Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990).
The supreme courts of Texas and Michigan have required that the claim of CSA
be objectively verifiable. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996); Lemmerman v. Fealk,
534 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 1995).
17See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crawford, 682 A.2d 323 (Pa. Super. 1996). See generally
Monica L. Hayes, The Necessity of Memory Experts for the Defense in Prosecutions for Child
Sexual Abuse Based Upon Repressed Memories, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 69 (1994). "
181n Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1995), the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that before it could determine whether a specific "repressed recollection" tolled the
statute of limitations, the trial court need first determine whether the theory of repressed
recollection constitutes a "scientifically accepted and valid theory." Id.
19 Hunter v. Brown, No. 03A01-9504-CV-00127, 1996 WL 57944 (Tenn. App. Feb. 13,
1996)).
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[Tihere is little agreement among scientists, about whether a repressed
memory can be retrieved and, if it can, whether the memory retrieved
is an accurate product.
20
He referred to "a growing body of evidence indicating that many of these 'repressed'
memories of sexual abuse may be implanted in patients' minds, unwittingly or
otherwise, by therapists' suggestions. "21
In some cases these questions arose under doctrines such as Daubert and Frye,
requiring scientific evidence to meet tests of reliability22 and/or acceptance in
the appropriate scientific community.23
The Texas Supreme Court recently reviewed at length studies on memory in
general and recovered memory in particular. It concluded that there is no
reliable way of distinguishing accurate from false memories of CSA.24
The available scientific and clinical evidence does not allow accurate,
inaccurate, and fabricated memories to be distinguished in the absence of
independent corroboration. [It found that] the preconceptions of the
therapist, the suggestibility of the patient, the aleatory nature of memory
recall, and the need to find a clear culprit lor a diffuse set of symptoms may
lead to false memories. Or they may not.
In addition to the therapist's "possible confirmatory bias, her technique to recover
memories may have increased [the patient's]... suggestibility."26
In another recent case rejecting the claim that repression and later recovery
of memory tolled the statute of limitations the Supreme Court of Maryland
wrote: "After reviewing the arguments on both sides of the issue, we are
unconvinced that repression exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal
process of forgetting. Because we find these two processes to be indistinguishable
scientifically, it follows that they should be treated the same legally. "27
20 Ault v. Jasko, 673 N.E.2d 870, 875-76 (Ohio 1994) (citations omitted).
21Id. at 876.
22Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
251d. at 56-57 (quoting from AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Soc'Y, B. OF DIRECTORS,
GUIDELINES RELATING TO THE REPORTING OF RECOVERED MEMORIES § C.I. (1994)).
261d. at 59.
27Doev. Maskell, No. 102,1996 WL 426528 (Md Ct. App., July 29,1996). TheSupreme
Court of Pennsylvania also recently held that the discovery rule was inapplicable for an
action based on ostensible recovered memory of CSA. Pearce v. Salvation Army, 674
A.2d 1123 (Pa. Super. Apr. 17, 1996); but see Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286,
287-88 (D. Mass. 1996); see also Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055,1066 (E.D.
Mich. 1995). Cf. Logerquist v. Danforth, No. 2 CA-CV 96-0046, 1996 WL 563863 (Ariz.
App. Div. 2 Oct. 3, 1996) (of some interest is the court's agreement "that a plaintiff who
allegedly was sexually abused as a child but during minority repressed all memories of
the abuse until adulthood should have the opportunity to invoke the discovery rule,"
[Vol. 11:45
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In an aggravated felonious assault case where the victims had no memory
of the ostensible assaults for several years, but "recovered" their memories in
psychotherapy, the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to admit the
testimony of the alleged victims. 28 The court, after considering a wide range of
studies and evidence, concluded that "the phenomenon of memory repression, and
the process of therapy to recover the memories, have not gained general acceptance in
the field of psychology and are not scientifically reliable. "29
Accordingly, the testimony was precluded by the Frye test requiring that
evidence submitted as scientific must be accepted in the scientific community.30
Other courts in criminal prosecutions have required the trial judge to "exercise
a gatekeeping function and hold a preliminary evidentiary hearing outside the
presence of the jury in order to determine whether such evidence is reliable and
whether the situation is one on which expert testimony is appropriate."31
The most celebrated criminal case using repressed/recovered memory
testimony was George Franklin's prosecution for a murder committed twenty
years earlier. In 1969, the body of an eight-year-old girl, Susan Nason, was
found with its skull crushed. In 1989, Eileen Franklin-Lipsker, the defendant's
daughter, claimed remembering for the first time, witnessing her father murder
her friend, Susan. Although Franklin-Lipsker testified that the memory
returned while looking at her own eight-year-old daughter in a certain light,
she had given several other versions of the circumstances of the recall,
including attributing it to hypnosis while in therapy. Ms. Franklin-Lipsker
testified from her "recovered memory" that she had witnessed her father rape
her friend and bludgeon her to death.
In 1995, Franklin's conviction was set aside on the ground that news
accounts, including many of the details testified to by Ms. Franklin-Lipsker,
were erroneously excluded. Her testimony could have been influenced by such
news accounts, including a televised video of the crime scene. The state
declined to reprosecute.
while prefacing that proposition with the words '[aissuming the trial court determines that
evidence of the repressed memory is admissible .. .
28 State v. Hungerford, Nos. 94-S-045 to 94-S-047, 93-S-1734 to 93-S-1936, 1995 WL
378571 (N.H. May 23, 1995) (J. Groff).
291d. at *1. 1-
30 While reliability of recovered memories is central to the present analysis, the-
substantive and procedural issues regarding application of doctrines of Daubert, Frye,
etc., are only indirectly relevant.
More to the point is the state of scientific, experimental, clinical, and neurological
evidence on issues of reliability. Particularly important to the present thesis is the impact
of certain practices by therapists on such reliability; even more central are the kind of
practices that create a substantial risk of producing false memories in the mind of the
patient.
31 State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 884 (R.I. 1996).
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B. Suits by Patients against Therapists
Over 300 patients have retracted charges against parents and others.
"Retractors have come forward with well-validated accounts of suggestive,
abusive therapy that led to bogus memories," and to several malpractice suits
against therapists, where 22 retractors have won judgments and legal
settlements ranging from $120,000 to more than $5 million. 32
In one such case, a jury awarded plaintiff $2.6 million, after she testified that
the therapist diagnosed multiple personality disorder and told her she must
have been repeatedly sexually abused by relatives.33 The therapist told her she
could not remember the abuse because it was repressed, but to be helped she
would have to recover such memories. 34
In a Colorado suit by a patient who sought therapy for treatment of
depression, the therapist used hypnosis and a number of other suggestive
techniques to help the patient "recover memories" of being incestuously abused
by her father. Eventually the patient had glimmers of memories that escalated
into recollections of weekly sexual assaults until she "remembered" that her
parents sold her into child prostitution. When she expressed doubts about the
reality of these memories, the therapist suggested that such doubts proved the
severity of the trauma. "She told me that one of every three women are incest
victims.... I questioned everything .... But she would get angry and say, 'Why
don't you just accept this? You want to get better, don't you?' Little by little, I
began to believe it."35
Thereafter, the patient deteriorated into psychotic depression, attempted
suicide, and required hospitalization. "By then, I wanted to die,' she said. 'If
my father did this to me, I didn't want to live."' 36 Following his daughter's
accusations, the father suffered four strokes. At the trial for malpractice brought
by the patient, the defendant made no claim that the father had actually
committed the abuses, or that the memories were authentic. 37
University of Pennsylvania psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Sadoff writes of a
Minnesota case in which
a jury found that a psychiatrist had ... failed to obtain the requisite
informed consent from the patient before embarking on an
32 Katy Butler, The Latest on Recovered Memory, FAMILY THERAPY NErWORKER 36
(Nov. /Dec. 1996).
33 Paul Gustafson, Jury Award Patient $2.6 Million: Verdict Finds Therapist Humenansky
Liable in Repressed-Memory Trial, STAR TRIB., Aug. 1, 1995, at lB.
34Id.
35Sue Lindsay, How Therapy Drove Women into the Hospital: Jane Brennan Talks About
"False Memory" Suit She Won and the Power Therapists Have, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Nov. 5, 1995, at 6A. (Five other patients of that therapist have brought suit).
361d.
37 Harry MacLean, Some Therapists Who Claim to Recover Memories May Actually Induce
Them, DENVER PosT, Dec. 9, 1995, at B7.
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experimental course of treatment when there were safer, more
effective, and proven methods available. The patient alleged that all of her
recovered memories were false, implanted by the psychiatrist during therapy
sessions which sometimes included hypnosis, sodium amytal, and
inappropriate suggestive reading materials. She recovered memories of sexual
abuse purportedly inflicted by her mother, father, grandmother, uncles,
neighbors, and many others with whom she had come into contact. The
psychiatrist diagnosed her as having multiple personality disorder with one
hundred personalities, some of which were male, some female, some children,
and some animals. The most bizarre recovered "memories" were those
involving satanic ritual abuse in which the patient recalled numerous babies
being served buffet style.3 8
The veracity of claims that a person was sexually traumatized as a child,
profoundly forgot or repressed the experience, yet recalled it years later 39
depends on the validity of the theses that: a) repressed memories occur and
are recoverable; and/or b) the process of attempting recovery does not itself
produce false memories of childhood sexual trauma.
This Article will examine the claims regarding repression of traumatic
experiences, and consider the issues around retrieval or recovery of purported
memories, issues of undue suggestiveness in circumstances and techniques.40
38 Robert Sadoff, M.D., Child Abuse and Repressed Memory Testimony, 1 QuNNIpLAc
HEALTH L.J. 79,85-86 (1996). For a general review of suits against therapists by retractors
and accused persons see, e.g., Taub, supra note 7, at 208-13.
39 And in adequate detail to know the nature of the abuse and the identity of the
abuser, who is then accused of molestation.
40 0ne summary of the assumptions that "flow from the notion that one can repress
memories of prior experience and then subsequently resurrect them in pristine
form-an idea that has virtually no support in controlled scientific studies in either basic
or applied psychological research," was formulated from a number of works by
Professor Elizabeth Loftus, critical of the recovered memory movement:
(1) We are more prone than not to banish traumatic experiences
from consciousness completely, because they are too horrifying to
contemplate;
(2) We usually do not remember these forgotten experiences by any
normal process, but only through special psychotherapist techniques;
(3) These counseling interventions produce reliable and valid recovery
of memories;
(4) Before re-emerging to conscious awareness, the forgotten
experiences cause miserable symptoms and problems in living for
many people;
(5) "Psychoarcheological" excavations and reliving the forgotten
experiences supposedly cure diagnosable mental conditions such
as depression, chronic anxiety, panic attacks, bulimia/anorexia,
personality disorders, and others too numerous to mention.
Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Patient-Psychotherapist Privilege: Access to Clinical Records
in the Tangled Web of Repressed Memory Litigation, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 109, 111-12 (1996).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
C. Suits by Accused Child Molesters Against Therapists
The Ramona case41 was the first, and most cited, case in which an accused
father successfully sued therapists involved in the treatment of his adult
daughter. The daughter, Holly Ramona, presented to the psychologist and
eventually to a recommended psychiatrist, with an eating disorder (bulimia),
but with no memories or beliefs that she had been sexually abused.
Subsequently, the patient began to have flashbacks of sexual contacts with her
father. The therapist apparently told the patient's mother that seventy to eighty
percent of sufferers of bulimia had been sexually abused. The patient was put
in weekly group sessions, facilitated by the therapist, which emphasized the
probability of sexual victimization.
At the suggestion of the therapist, Holly was eventually given sodium
amytal. In the resultant altered state of mind, Holly accused her father, who
was not then present, of having repeatedly raped her as a child. The patient's
subsequent expressions of doubts about such abuse were met with assurances
by the psychologist and psychiatrist that it was impossible to tell lies under the
influence of sodium amytal, absent special training.
The two psychotherapists then invited the father to the hospital so the
daughter could confront him with the accusations. Influenced in part by the
accusations, the father's wife filed for divorce, seeking custody of the couple's
two minor daughters. Holly Ramona brought suit against her father.
While Holly's suit was pending, the father sued the therapist and the
psychiatrist. Ajury awarded the father $475,000 (without deciding whether the
abuse had actually occurred). 42
About forty Ramona-type suits have been filed nationally by accused family
members against therapists.43 More than a handful of these suits have
produced jury awards or substantial settlements.
The legal theories asserted by plaintiffs have included: negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, malpractice, failure to obtain
informed consent, civil conspiracy, defamation,44 interference in filial relations,
breach of contract (with the parental third-party payer), failure to warn, 45
41Ramona v. Isabella, No. C61898 (Cal. Super. Ct., Napa County May 13, 1994).
42These factors have been garnered from Kathy Butler, Clashing Memories, Mixed
Messages, L.A. TIMEs, June 26,1994, at 12; and Richard Cole, Suit Won Against 2 Therapists,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 15, 1994, at A3.
While there are a number of additional and significant complexities to this case,
the essential facts,for purposes of illustrating the type of suit involved, are as stated in the
text.
43Anna Snider, Accused Abusers Fight Back: Novel suit says therapists instilled false
memories of incest, 47 N.J. L.J., Nov. 18, 1996, at 1.
44See Associated Press, Doctor Loses $350,000 Slander Suit: Analyst Told Family Parents
Abused Woman, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 20, 1994, at 31A.
45E.g., Plaintiff-parent is claiming in a New Jersey suit that therapists had duty to
warn parents about possible accusations against them, citing a Tarasoff-type case in New
Jersey (i.e., McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979)) and another
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fraud, and misrepresentation. In state after state, courts are beginning to
examine the legal bases, if any, for suits by plaintiffs (accused by patients of
child molestation) against therapists for implanting false memories in the
minds of the accusers. 46
Insurance companies are now exercising caution in evaluating providers and
the therapists they recommend. They look for networks which recommend
therapists who would not "force a memory of childhood sexual abuse on a
patient who otherwise shows no overt signs of having been abused.'
47
The judicial opinions at this point on legal issues associated with suits
against therapists by persons accused, vary in significant facts and relevant law,
but none unambiguously addresses the paradigm fact situation under
generally applicable legal doctrine. Two appellate opinions address the viability
of a suit against a therapist treating an adult patient.
In Doe v. McKay,48 the Illinois Court of Appeals held that valid causes of
action were stated in a complaint by a patient's father against a therapist under
the following alleged facts: in the presence of the plaintiff-father; a) the daughter,
at the therapist's direction, accused plaintiff of sexually abusing her at age
eleven; b) the therapist-defendant repeatedly told the daughter that plaintiff
might further harm her, and told the father that; c) his daughter had recovered
a repressed memory of the sexual abuse, he was repressing the memory of his
acts, and he ought to begin psychological treatment at the defendant's facility.
The complaint stated that the daughter thereafter told plaintiff that the
defendant arranged the session for its shock effect in order to force a confession.
The father denied, in the complaint, that he had ever sexually abused his
daughter.
The trial court had dismissed the father's claims that the therapist had: a)
negligently treated the daughter (thus not violating any duty of care owed to
the plaintiff or depriving the plaintiff of his daughter's society and
companionship); and b) intentionally interfered with the parent-child
relationship. (Other claims were still pending in the trial court.)
The appeals court, after indicating the factors generally relevant to whether
a legal duty exists, 49 found that valid causes of action were stated under Illinois
law:
New Jersey decision holding a physician liable for failure to pass on genetic information
(i.e., Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)). Snider, supra note 43.
46 See, e.g., Paul B. Johnson, Repressed Memory Cases on the Rise Nationwide, IDAHO
FALLS POST REGISTER, Jan. 30, 1995, see also Snider, supra note 43.
47 Michael Schachner, 'False Memory' Risk Surfaces Providing Mental Health Benefits
Could Lead to Lawsuits, CRAIN COMM., INC. Bus. INS., June 27, 1994, at 14.
48678 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997).
49
"In determining whether a duty exists, the court must weigh the foreseeability of
the injury, the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against
it, and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant." Id. at 52.
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[A]s a general rule, negligence [can] not be founded upon the breach
of a duty owed to some person other than the plaintiff....
[H]owever,. .. derivative actions, such as those of a husband or
parent for the loss of the wife's or child's society, demonstrate that the
law has long recognized that a wrong done to one person may invade the
protected rights of one who is intimately related to the first.50
The court concluded that the "transferred negligence" doctrine was applicable:
"Key to this finding is the special relationship plaintiff shares with his daughter and
the therapist's action to bring plaintiff into the treatment process."51
The court further stated: "Once plaintiff was immersed in his daughter's
treatment process, as a quasi-patient himself, it was not only reasonably
foreseeable, but a virtual certainty, that McKay's conduct would harm
plaintiff's relationship with his daughter."52
Applying factors relevant to determining whether a defendant has breached
a duty owed to a plaintiff, the court observed:
The risk and magnitude of harm to our society, namely, tearing afamily apart
without regard to the manner in which false accusations of sexual abuse are
made, is so significant that it requires the protection of our law. A therapist's
allegedly erroneous conclusion that a patient has been sexually abused
by a parent endangers the parent-child relationship, but where the
therapist draws the accused parent into the patient-child's treatment,
accusations of sexual abuse are undeniably devastating and may not be made
with impunity and disregard of the therapist's obligation of reasonable care.
5 3
.. We therefore hold that in a case such as this involving repressed
memories of sexual abuse, where the parent is brought into the
treatment process by the therapist, a therapist's duty to the patient to
use reasonable care in the treatment process is extended to the parent.
54
5 0The Doe v. McKay court relied on Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250
(Ill. 1977), a case widely cited in biomedical ethics as involving a preconception tort. In
Renslow, eight years before plaintiff was born, plaintiff's mother was negligently
transfused with incompatible blood. As a result, plaintiff was born with permanent
physical damage. Plaintiff was permitted recovery.
51Doe v. McKay, 678 N.E.2d at 53.
52Id.
53
"Defendants could have warned plaintiff and his daughter of the controversial
nature of repressed memory therapy in separate sessions." Id.
Although the therapist possessed a Ph.D. in psychology, he was not licensed. It
was unclear, because there were inconsistent provisions in the relevant statutes, whether
he was practicing "clinical psychology" illegally.
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The court concluded that Illinois recognized a cause of action for "direct
interference with filial relationships and recovery for loss of society stemming
from that interference."55
While a number of cases (e.g., Ramona) have involved accusations made in a
therapist's office against a family member, many others have not. Allegations
such as intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress were not before
the Illinois court. Nevertheless the strong condemnation of the therapist's
actions, the recognition that such accusation can destroy a family, and the
attention given to the "special relationship" between the patient and the
plaintiff suggest that a legal duty might well have been found even if the father
had not been accused in the therapist's consultation room. On the other hand,
there is law to support the proposition that "presence" is an important factor in
determining legal liability for infliction of emotional distress.
The most recent appellate opinion regarding a suit by an accused person
against a therapist treating an adult is Russell v. Adams.56 In Russell, an adult
patient's mother brought an action claiming that the therapist told the daughter
that the mother was mentally ill and had "abused"57 the daughter, and further
that the therapist had recommended that the daughter sever all ties with her
mother.
The court upheld dismissal of a claim of medical malpractice, and ruled that
the statute of limitations had not run on the mother's claim of infliction of
emotional distress. It reversed the trial court's dismissal of the mother's claim
of negligent and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress without
addressing "whether the complaint otherwise alleges the necessary elements
of these torts...."58 In finding that a malpractice claim can be brought only by
a patient,59 the court made the following observations:
55 Doe v. McKay, 678 N.E.2d at 54; see also infra Part X; see also Sullivan v. Cheshier,
846 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1994) where parents of an adult daughter sued her therapist
alleging that the therapist: 1) had implanted, through hypnosis, a false memory that
her brother had molested her; and 2) had instructed his patient to break contact with
her parents if they disagreed. In concluding that Illinois law permitted a suit for
intentional interference with family relations, the federal court observed that two of the
traditional rationale for precluding third party suits against therapists were absent: i.e.,
"the availability of a tort remedy to the injured child, [and] the possible multiplication
of claims ..." Id. at 660.
"In this case and cases like this, the child will not sue and claims will not be
multiplied. Indeed, the gravamen of this particular sort of claim is that the damage
inflicted by the defendant causes the inability of the child to sue." Id. at 661.
The Sullivan court characterized the claimed injury as "the excision of [plaintiffs']
daughter from their family." Id.
56482 S.E.2d 30 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
57The opinion and evidently the complaint, gives no indication of the nature of the
alleged "abuse."
581d. at 33.
59 A point consistent with the thesis of this Article.
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We are aware that the treatment of the emotional problems of the patient may,
in some instances, have adverse consequences on the patient's relationship
with others.... It does not follow, however, that the affected third party should
have a cause of actionfor malpractice against the health care provider. Health
care providers must "be free to recommend a course of treatment and act on
the patient's response to the recommendation free from the possibility that
someone other than the patient might complain in the future." In other
words, "doctors should owe their duty to their patient and not to
anyone else" so as not to compromise this primary duty.
60
The concerns expressed by the court are obviously of weight. It is not the
thesis of this Article, however, that whenever psychotherapy disrupts a
relationship or causes emotional pain to a third party, the injured party has a
cognizable legal claim. Effective therapy produces changes, sometimes
resulting in drastic changes in relationships between patients and others.
Sometimes the patient's emotional growth makes an existing marriage, which
may have rested on complementary neurotic symptoms, untenable. Sometimes
a patient may justifiably conclude that continued contact with parents
threatens his or her mental health.
For reasons articulated below, certain misconduct by therapists is so
egregious and irresponsible and strongly tends to generate such devastating
emotional, familial, and reputational injuries, that it is vastly different both in
kind and degree 6 ' from anything within a wide range of typicality.
In Turman v. Genesis Associates, a federal case applying Pennsylvania law,62
plaintiffs sued therapists treating their twenty-year-old daughter, Diane. They
alleged that defendants had implanted false memories to the effect that
plaintiffs belonged to a satanic cult and had ritually murdered Diane's twin
brother, and that her father had raped and impregnated her. The defendants
were alleged to have caused the daughter to make these allegations before a
group and to have urged and assisted her in hiding to avoid harm from her
parents.
Given that the parents paid for the therapy, the court declined to dismiss the
claim for breach of contract. The negligence claim was found actionable based
on a specific undertaking to the parents, together with reasonably foreseeable
harm to them.63
60 Russell v. Adams, 482 S.E.2d 30, 32-33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)(quoting Lindgren);
Lindgren v. Moore, 907 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
6 1 Moreover even if the differences could be deemed "only" differences in degree, as
Justice Holmes observed: "a man's fate... [often] depends on his estimating rightly,
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree." Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373,377 (1913).
62Tuman v. Genesis Assoc., 935 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [Tunan III; Tuman v.
Genesis Assoc., 894 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1995) [Tuman I].
631 predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that
in the absence of any other statutory duty of care, a therapist owes a
duty of reasonable care to a patient's parents, where (1) the therapist
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The court made these important observations:
[Defendants argue that] "[t]o allow a duty to run to the parents...
would place- the defendant in the untenable position of having to
choose between her duty to the patient and a duty to the relatives of
the patient or to some other third party." I disagree .... The therapist's
two duties dovetail to a singular duty to provide reasonably acceptable mental
health therapy to the patient.
Further, my narrow holding does not subject therapists to negligence
liability whenever parents experience emotional injury that may result
when a child seeks mental health counseling. There is a vast difference
between using acceptable therapy to help a patient understand emotional
wounds suffered as a result of her parents' inadequate caregiving,64 and
negligent techniques that create false memories of severely abusive parenting
that necessarily injure the parents and the patient.
65
Potentially most significant was the court's holding regarding the plaintiffs'
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress: "[riegardless of whether
Defendants owed plaintiffs any duty of care with respect to Diane's mental
health counseling, Defendants had independent duties not to intentionally inflict
emotional distress upon Plaintiffs. "66
This holding, if generallyfollowed, would in many cases, provide a basis for an action
by persons falsely accused ("intentionally" includes the concept of "recklessly"). The
arguable applicability of the doctrine of intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress, and the closely related doctrine of torts actionable because
of their outrageous nature are discussed below in Part IX(B)(C).
There have been several suits against therapists treating minor children.
specifically undertook to treat the child for the parents; (2) the parents
relied upon the therapist; (3) the therapist was aware of the parents'
reliance; and (4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the parents would
be harmed by the therapist's conduct.
Tuman I, 894 F. Supp. at 188.
64 This is significant in terms of recognizing that not all parent or spouse bashing or
blaming would be subject to a suit. Indeed such blaming seems to go on in many, if not
most therapist-patient relationships. See Terence W. Campbell, Therapeutic Relationships
and latrogenic Outcomes: The Blame-and-Change Maneuver in Psychotherapy, 29
PSYCHOTHERAPY 474 (1992).
65 Tuman I, 894 F. Supp. at 189. Since the 1996 opinion of the district court in Tuman
II, the plaintiffs' daughter (the patient) has brought suit against the therapists. So have
two other patients. The therapists are counterclaiming for damages based on their
allegation that defamatory statements in the pleadings are not privileged.
661d. In a subsequent opinion, Tuman II, the court held that the failure to prove
emotional injuries by expert medical confirmation warranted dismissal of this claim.
Turnan II, 935 F. Supp. 1375. Regarding "claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the [Pennsylvania Supreme Court] imposed the requirement of expert medical
evidence of the distress as a counterweight to the ease with which fraudulent claims of
outrageous behavior could be brought." Id. at 1393.
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In Caryl S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatment Services,67 in the Supreme Court,
Erie County, New York, the court upheld a cause of action by grandparents
against a therapist treating their grandchild. The complaint, as construed,
charged the therapist with "negligently" or with gross negligence, misdiagnosing
the child as having been sexually abused by the grandparent, and with
"communicating] that conclusion to several persons and agencies, negligently,
carelessly and recklessly," thus, causing plaintiffs foreseeable serious harm. The
complaint was upheld, not as a defamation action, but evidently as one for
negligent or intentional infliction of harm.68
The determination of whether sexual abuse has occurred is made
not only about the child but also about the suspected abuser. When, based
upon that determination, a course of action is thereafter embarked
upon by the professional, it is intended to, and necessarily does, affect
both the child and his or her abuser, especially where a family
relationship is involved. A suspected abuser surely has the right to a
reasonable expectation that such a determination, touching him or her as
profoundly as it will, will be carefully made and will not be reached in a
negligent manner.
The possible harm to a child from a professional misdiagnosis in
such circumstances has . . .been noted. The potential harm to the
alleged abuser is equally great. Thus, I conclude that, where the
determination of sexual abuse is made by a professional treating a child, with
subsequent actions taken based upon that determination and aimed, whether
in whole or in part, at shaping not only the conduct and well-being of the child
but also the conduct of the suspected abuser, or the relationship between them,
a duty of care is owed not only to the child but also to the alleged abuser.69
Cases in which a therapist allegedly misdiagnoses abuse in treating a young
child tend to occur in the context of statutory immunity. For example, when
the therapist complies with a reporting statute, (requiring that therapists report
cases of suspected child abuse to certain agencies) or completes an evaluation
or report in connection with a judicial proceeding,70 the therapist is typically
held immune from liability for ordinary negligence.
67 Caryl S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatment Servs., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1994).
68
"[i]t is not the communication of the opinion in and of itself which is the gravamen
of this action but rather the negligence in reaching that opinion." Id. at 664.
691d. at 667.
7OSee, e.g., Vineyard v. Kraft, 828 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); May v.
Southeast Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 866 P.2d 732,738 (Wyo. 1993); Dominguez v. Kelly,
786 S.W.2d 749, 740, 752-53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
Two California cases in which the therapist, committed to the view that a child had
been sexually abused, took steps beyond therapy and beyond reporting, to keep the
father from contact or custody of the child, were resolved in opposite ways. Schwarz v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)(the father, as a third
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In a Texas case not involving statutory immunity, where the psychologist
was hired by the child's mother to examine the child for signs of abuse, the
court denied the accused father recovery on a claim for negligent misdiagnosis. 71
[The] right to sue a mental health professional must be considered in light of
... the social utility of eradicating sexual abuse. Evaluating children to
determine whether sexual abuse has occurred is essential -to that
goal.... Young children's difficulty in communicating sexual abuse
heightens the need for experienced mental health professionals to evaluate the
child. Because they are dealing with such a sensitive situation, mental
health professionals should be allowed to exercise their professional
judgment in diagnosing sexual abuse of a child without the judicial
imposition of a countervailing duty to third parties.
72
Contrary to this case, however, and generally consistent with the views to
be elaborated, is an opinion of the Colorado Court of Appeals.73 A therapist
counseling a child reported to county officials that the four-year-old child had
been sexually abused by her father during a visit. Additionally, the therapist
testified on behalf of the mother, in litigation over the father's visitation rights.
The plaintiff-father (in a suit against the therapist) submitted an affidavit of a
psychologist previously selected by both the mother and the father, expressing
the views that
(1) there is no support in the literature for the assertion that a child's
body language can provide an infallible indication as to a child's
veracity; (2) psychological testing of the child disclosed that she so
confused fantasy with reality that she could report fantasy as fact and
use appropriate body language in doing so; (3) Bebensee [the
defendant-therapist] did not undertake steps to assure that ... [the
therapist's] personal prejudices did not influence her. .. ; [4] Bebensee
did not give any psychological tests to the child; [5] [she] made no
investigation of the reports made by the child to other parties so as to
determine whether they were consistent or inconsistent with the
statements made to her; [6] she diagnosed [the father] .. . as a child
abuser while refusing to speak with him; and [7] she disregarded the
reports of other professionals.
74
party to the physician-patient relationship, had no right to sue); James W. v. Superior
Court (Goodfriend), 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)(father had right to
sue).
71Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769-70 (Tex. 1994).
72 Id. at 769.
73 Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
74 Id. at 287.
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After examining factors relevant to the question of duty,75 the court found:
[the therapist] owed a duty of due care to the father in this case. We
reach this conclusion after considering both the great social utility of
having therapists make reports of suspected child abuse and the
significant risk of substantial injury that may occur to one falsely
accused of being a child abuser. Certainly the harm that may result
from negligent false accusations is readily foreseeable, while the
burden of due care placed upon therapists is no greater than the duty
that substantially all professionals are required to meet.
76
The court upheld against a motion for summary judgment the claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, regarding the therapist's counseling
the mother to deny visitation rights, and the role the therapist played at the
hearing. The claims of negligence would not be upheld with respect to the
reports to county officials, because immunity statutes provided protection for
a good faith (albeit negligent) report of CSA.77
The court found, however, that the defendant's actions, if they were as
alleged, would arguably constitute outrageous conduct amounting to intentional
infliction of emotional distress and further, that the reporting statute would not
provide immunity for such a level of culpability.78
As noted earlier, the basis of suit to be advocated herein, will not be mere
negligent misdiagnosis or negligent acceptance of a patient's claim that she had
been sexually abused in childhood; rather it will require proof by the plaintiff that
the patient upon initiating therapy had no memories of being sexually abused, and that
only after the therapist recklessly and outrageously used hypersuggestive techniques
that tended to induce an illusory memory, was the plaintiff accused of childhood sexual
molestation.
III. DEVASTATING IMPACT OF FALSE ACCUSATIONS
To be accused of sexually molesting a child is to be deemed a moral monster.
The enormity of these crimes is such that murders, arsonists, and even rapists
of adult women consider child molesters the scum of the earth and, in jail and
prison situations, target them, above all others, for vicious assaults, rapes, and
even death.
As one court has observed, "child abuser" is "one of the most loathsome labels
in society."79 Those believed to be child molesters face a public opprobrium
compounding disgust, detestation, hatred, fear, and sometimes homicidal
751d. at 287-89. See discussion of CONCEPT OF DuTy, infra at Part X.
76761 P.2d at 288-89.
77Id. at 288.
781d. at 289-90.
79Rossignol v Silvemail, 185 A.D.2d 497, 499 (N.Y. A.D. 3d Dep't. 1992).
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hostility. Indeed, given the recent widespread adoption of "Megan's Law," of
all who have served their sentences, only child molesters are continually
marked for monitoring and publicity, sometimes to entire neighborhoods or
communities. Only child molesters are subject to chemical castration. 80
Compounding this uniquely demonizing stigma, which places an accused
child molester far outside the perimeters of the human family, is the anguish
imposed by virtue of the close familial relationship to the accuser (often a
daughter). Further aggravating the horror of a false accusation is the not
infrequent severance of family bonds involving parents-children;
husband-wife; sibling-sibling; aunts, uncles, in-laws, and grand-parents.
Accusations of CSA sabotage the shared history of entire families and
massively threaten the very foundations on which family attachments rest.
Other consequences often include loss of livelihood, termination of
friendships, and social and self-imposed isolation. Often, finding oneself to be
a social pariah, the falsely accused person must change his domicile to a distant
community.81
Nothing that has been said is meant to diminish the atrocity of sexual abuse
of children. But, given the profoundly outrageous nature of such conduct, care
must be taken to avoid a profoundly outrageous false accusation: one which
brands an innocent person as hostem generis humani, an enemy of the human
race.
The accused's denial of the allegation rarely prevents the harms to the
accused. Those learning of the accusations typically assume that all criminals
deny crime, that molesters above all will deny their enormities, 82 and that in
any event, where there is smoke there is fire.
As was once said of rape, accusations of child molestation claimed to have
occurred decades ago, are easy to make and almost impossible to defend
80
"Megan's Laws" are laws enacted in several states, requiring registration and/or
varying degrees of public notice in communities where convicted sexual offenders
reside. The term refers to Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl who was raped and
murdered by a paroled sex offender living in Megan's neighborhood. See generally
Edward Martone, Megan's Law: When a Sex Offender Moves in, is there a Duty to Warn the
Community? 81 A.B.A. J. 38 (1995).
Recent California legislation imposes chemical castration [with the drug Depo
Provera] on those convicted twice of crimes involving sexual molestation of children.
A.B. 3339, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., § 2 (Cal. 1995)(enacted 1996). Other states are considering
similar legislation. See, e.g., Staff, Iowa Governor Urges Chemical Castration of Repeat Child
Molesters, WEsT's LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 31, 1996, at 13883.
81The distinguished writer, Jack Olsen, in his work, PREDATOR: RAPE, MADNESS, AND
INJUSTICE IN SEATTLE (1991) gives a chilling trie account of a man erroneously convicted
of rape, as a result of a deliberately fixed and fraudulent photo display (of extreme
suggestiveness). The cost to the innocent man was the loss and destruction of all that was
valuable in his life, a series of breakdowns and severe decompensation even after he
was released.
82 0f course, actual molesters may "deny" their crimes in two senses of the word: a)
they may explicitly reject an accusation knowing it is true; or b) they may have
profoundly forgotten it.
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against. To prove a negative is hard enough; to negate charges of conduct that
allegedly occurred in private decades ago is a burden few can carry. And to
prove it in a public arena, in social and workplace settings, where the
accusation implicitly places the burden on the accused, is a monumental task.
The analogy to Salem may not be perfect, but it does resonate with certain
truths. Falsely accused of doing the devil's work, by innocent agents of
irresponsible instigators, in an atmosphere of hysteria and social abhorrence,
the very charge itself so inflames that little attention is given by society to the
question of guilt or innocence.
IV. PREMISES OF RECOVERED MEMORY THERAPY
The sexual abuse of children, more often female children, is far more
prevalent than commonly believed.
Not surprisingly, estimates of CSA vary. Given that the kind of abuse
connected with recovered memory therapy involves physical contact, and
usually more than one episode, what do the studies indicate?
A study published in 198383 found that 38 percent of woman experienced at
least one instance of contact CSA before age eighteen (4.5 percent by their
fathers). Other studies have found 6 percent,8 4 34.2 percent,85 (2 percent by
fathers or stepfathers)86 and up to 75 percent. 87 In a 1994 review of studies,
Finkelhor8 8 estimated that twenty percent of women in the United States
suffered some type of CSA, that four to five percent were victimized by pene-
tration or oral-genital contact, and that more than half of CSA is perpetrated
outside the family.89
The widely shared premises of recovered memory psychotherapists seem to
be:
Society avoids confronting the reality of sexual abuse of children, by a
widespread societal denial.
83 DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE SEcRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LrvEs OF GIRLS AND
WOMEN 61 (1986).
84See reference to Burnham study in S. D. Peters et al., Prevalence in A SOURCEBOOK
ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 15-18 (David Finkelhor & Sharon Araji eds., 1986).
85 David Finkelhor et al., Sexual Abuse in the National Survey of Adult Men and Women:
Prevalence, Characteristics, and Risk Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 19-28
(1990)(surveying 2626 men and women).
86 Total of contact and non-contact abuse.
87 Gail E. Wyatt, The Sexual Abuse of Afro-American and White-American Women in
Childhood, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 507-19 (1985)(using a sample size of 248 woman
in Los Angeles).
88 Finkelhor published a much-cited study in 1979 finding that 19.2% of women
suffered CSA. DAvID FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTMIZED CHILDREN 42,53 (1979).
89 David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse,
4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 31-53 (1994).
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* Children who have been sexually abused often repress the memory of
such abuse.
* Victims of CSA suffer, in adulthood, a variety of behavioral and
emotional symptoms.
" It is possible, by observing symptomology of a patient, to diagnose CSA
as a root cause.
90
* By a variety of techniques, employed in therapy over a period of
time-e.g., bibliotherapy, suggested dream content, hypnosis, guided
imagery, support groups-a repressed or buried experience of CSA, in
patients who presented with no memory of CSA, can be brought to
conscious memory, producing recall in significant detail regarding the
patient's sexual exploitation in childhood.
" Vividly imagining sexual abuse with accompanying severe emotional
distress is indicative of actual historic abuse. 
1
" The recovery of memory of CSA is therapeutically beneficial to the
patient.
92
" It may also be therapeutically beneficial for the patient to confront the
abuser 93 and even to bring a lawsuit against him (as a way of healing
and obtaining validation).
94
90Alternatively, a) when a patient presents with bulemia or with sexual dysfunction,
either or both symptoms are erroneously taken indicate that the patient was a victim of
CSA; or b) for some incest-abuse therapists, the premise is that most adult female
patients are victims of CSA.
91See, e.g., OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 15, at 109. In response, Ofshe points out the
defective reasoning involved: "if patients believe in the abuse narrative they will
experience emotional pain. That pain can then be used as evidence for the validity of
the abuse, which bolsters the belief." Id.
92Some highly reputed therapists today take the view that the most effective therapy
does not require or involve delving into the patient's ancient history; but instead
involves working on present feelings, interactions, behaviors, etc. An eminent
theorist-clinician rejects the "unpeeling" of key historical events, observing that
"[p]ersonality is a process, not an onion." PAUL L. WAcHTEL, PSYCHOANALYSIS, BEHAVIOR
THERAPY, AND THE RELATIONAL WORLD (1997).
93Lawsuits may be encouraged as a "hope for emotional justice, a very important
step towards devictimization, [or as a] further source of validation." SUsAN FORWARD &
CRAIG BUCK, BETRAYALOF INNOCENCE: INCEST AND ITS DEVASTATION (1988).
Contrary to such advice, as most readers of this Article will realize, a patient is as
likely to find emotional turmoil as to find new emotional strength in bringing a lawsuit
against an alleged child molester. See also, Loftus et al., supra note 40, at 112, n.13.
The Canadian Psychiatry Association has observed:
poorly trained or misguided therapists have been urging patients, as a
specific part of their therapy, to confront and accuse the alleged perpe-
trators of the abuse once they have been identified. As a consequence...
members of the patient's family are most often identified and accused,
where recovered memories are found to be false, family relationships
are unnecessarily and often permanently disrupted.
June 1996 Position Statement: Adult Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 41
CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 305 (1996) [hereinafter June 1996 Position Statement].
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
V REPRESSION AND MEMORY RECOVERY
The memory process can be conveniently separated into three temporal
components: a) input/perception, b) storage, and c) retrieval/recall. 95
A. Input/Perception
Repression 96 is believed to be a psychological or neurological process by
which events, usually quite traumatic, are removed from, or never enter,
conscious thought, by virtue of a mechanism that may itself operate either by
intention or automatically. It is unlike an event that is merely forgotten or an
event that never enters the memory. Repression enables a person to continue
functioning without being burdened by unacceptable thoughts and images. A
person who experiences a particularly traumatic event may find it difficult or
impossible to function normally while simultaneously maintaining memories
of the event. The memories are simply too overwhelming. In order to cope and
function in life, the victim buries (represses)97 the memory, keeping the secret
even from herself.
Theoretical/clinical psychologists Bowers and Farvolden express the view
that whether or not traumatic thoughts and images are technically repressed,
there may be a mental mechanism that keeps such thoughts from conscious
awareness-an active avoidance mechanism that habitually and automatically
keeps disturbing thoughts from entering the awareness.98
The views of one authority, psychologist Richard Ofshe, have been
summarized as follows:
repressed memory therapists confuse common memory phenomena
such as normal memory decay, motivated avoidance, and selective
amnesia with the idea of repression. For example, we have all had the
9 4 See ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, TIrE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1988); see also JOSEPH E. CRNICH & KIMBERLY A.
CRNICH, SHIFTING THE BURDENOF TRUTH: SUING CHILD SEXUALABUSER-A LEGAL GUIDE
FOR SURVIVORS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS (1992); and Kimberly A. Cmich, Redressing the
Undressing: A Primer on the Representaiton of Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse,
14 WOMEN'S RTs L. REP. 65 (1992).
95 The American Psychiatric Association speaks of input, storage, retrieval, and
recounting. See Sadoff, supra note 38, at 79.
9 6 1t appears to this author that in exploring the matter of repression, one or more of
several issues might be under discussion: a) the triggers and processes of burying the
experience; b) the impact or non-impact of influences during storage of the buried
memory; c) the degree of effort necessary to access the memory; and d) the accuracy of
apparent retrieval of the repressed memory.
97 Psychologists Kenneth S. Bowers and Peter Farvolden define repression as
motivated forgetting of information that is very threatening to one's self-esteem or
self-concept." Kenneth S. Bowers & Peter Farvolden, Revisiting a Century-Old Freudian
Slip-From Suggestion Disavowed to the Truth Repressed, 119 PSYCHOL BULL. 355,359 (1996).
9 8 1d. at 360.
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experience of forgetting the details of an event over time, or even not
thinking about an event for a long time because it is painful,
guilt-provoking, or frightful. But a critical difference... between this
"motivated avoidance" and repression is that a person who prefers not
to think about a traumatic event, such as the death of a parent, will
remember that the parent has died; if this person had instead repressed
his memory according to the model of repression currently being
promoted, he would be entirely ignorant of having attended the
funeral and perhaps even of his [parent's] death. If asked about the
[funeral], he would have said he was certain that there was none or
absolutely sure that he did not attend.
99
Repression may be one of several alternative processes at the
input/perception stage. Under some views of repression, the mind or brain
registers the perceived event or experience more or less in accurate replication
of all the sensory, emotional, and thought processes entailed.
Another process that may occur at the time of a traumatic event or events is
"dissociation," a process at least as complex as repression (accordingly, there
are variations among experts in basic definition and description). As one
peruses the literature, one finds descriptions along the following lines (this
author's amalgam): When the mind experiences a severe trauma, it may
respond in a way that avoids fully experiencing all the qualities of the input. It
does this by splitting off, in effect in separate compartments, different elements,
such as feelings, beliefs, images, and memories. This may produce a protective
blunting, or a numbing against the full impact of the physical and psychic pain.
It may result in fragmentary memories of aspects of the event. In the more
severe dissociative reactions, a person may experience an altered state of
consciousness such as a fugue state, which even more profoundly avoids
absorption of the reality of the event.
Depending on the degree of dissociation, recollections, if any, may be more
or less distorted. 100 In the most severe cases there is a severe pathological
history and symptomology such that an experienced psychotherapist could
discern that one or more dissociative experiences had occurred. But
paradoxically, in the most severe cases, the original trauma may not be subject
to recall at all, or not to any reliable degree. Moreover, there would be no way
to discern whether any ostensibly recovered memory was accurate. In less
severe cases the patient may have some recall of traumatic episodes, even
before initiating therapy.
The current debate centers on the cases (unknown in number but involving
thousands of patients), in which patients present with no memory or even
partial memory or belief that they were sexually abused as children, and with
99 Murray, supra note 7, at 503-04.
10OPeople who are traumatized may suffer post-traumatic stress disorder. One cannot
be confident that an apparent memory expressed or experienced in "flashbacks" by such
a person is valid. See infra Part V(B).
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no symptoms justifying a diagnoses of CSA, yet eventually, as a result of the
therapy, purport to remember having been molested.101
The section which follows, dealing with the storage stage of memory,
addresses the heart of the disagreement regarding the concept of repression.
Many perceived experiences that register in the psyche or neuronal cells102
are subject to normal memory processes and normal or even deep forgetting
processes. Purported distinctions between such forgetting and the process of
repression, if such there be, become significant at the next stage of the memory
flow chart-i.e., the storage process.
B. Storage
The period between the perception and the recall of memories is the storage
stage. Controversy over what, if anything, happens to the experience/memory
in this stage is at the heart of the repressed memory debate between recovered
memory therapists and their critics.
Ordinary memory processes, resulting from ordinary forgetting, are subject
to a variety of distortive influences while in storage. The operation of various
influences on memory storage and retrieval is called confabulation. 103
Confabulation is an unconscious dynamic in which the material in one's
memory is altered by time, circumstances, new information, misinformation,
values, prejudices, beliefs, rationalizations, and various adjustments,
elaborations, and supplementations to "fit" or "fit-in" with psychic systems and
101 There are other views of dissociation that treat it as consistent with recovering the
memory of CSA. SeeJuDrrHL. HERMAN, TRAuMAAND RECOVERY 101-02(1992) (implicit).
In any event, Dr. Judith L. Herman, a Harvard psychiatrist and authority on abused
children, describes the response of children to traumatic parental sexual abuse:
The abused child's existential task is... formidable. Though
she perceives herself as abandoned to a power without mercy, she
must find a way to preserve hope and meaning. The alternative
is utter despair, something no child can bear....
All of the abused child's psychological adaptations serve the
fundamental purpose of preserving her primary attachment to her
parents in the face of daily evidence of their malice, helplessness,
or indifference. To accomplish this purpose, the child resorts to a
wide array of psychological defenses. By virtue of these defenses,
the abuse is either walled off from conscious awareness and memory,
so that it did not really happen, or minimized, rationalized, and
excused, so that whatever did happen was not really abuse.
The child victim prefers to believe that the abuse did not occur. In
the service of this wish, she tries to keep the abuse a secret from herself.
Id.
102Aside from repression and dissociation at the perception stage, some experiences
may simply never register, and thus not be subject to recall. These might include
non-traumatic forms of abuse, as well as experiences below the ages of three or four
years (which are subject to normal early childhood amnesia); they simply are not
retrievable.
103 Confabulation actually affects all stages of normal perception, forgetting, storage
and retrieval of memories.
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psychic needs. In other words, distortive and reconstructive processes alter the
material in the memory.
Were such processes known to be at work during long periods of forgetting,
such as the ten, twenty, thirty or more years often seen in recovered memory
cases, it would be manifestly irrational to treat such purported memories as
accurate, absent detective work corroborating the claimed memory in its
pertinent aspects.
But recovered memory advocates tend to explicitly or implicitly argue that
incestuous abuse triggers repression, and that the phenomenon of repression
is such that the repressed memory, unlike ordinary memory, is relatively
insulated and immune from distortive-constructive influences during the
storage stage (frozen in its pristine form) and sufficiently accurate in its graphic,
emotional, and descriptive detail so as to justify confidence that the abuse did
occur and the named perpetrator was the abuser.
Recovered memory therapists sometimes say, however, that whether the
apparent memory of abuse is or is not accurate is of no concern to the
therapeutic enterprise and/or that it is not their role to disbelieve a patient who
arrives at a memory of childhood incest. In one informal study, eighty-one
percent (of a random sample)
said they invariably believe their clients. One therapist said, "if a woman
said it happened, it happened." Another said, "I have no reason not to
believe them." More than two thirds of the clinicians reacted emotionally to
any use of the term authentic,feeling that what is authentic and what is not
authentic is not the job of a therapist.104
Some recovered memory therapists or writers may be purporting to embrace
the therapeutic premises of certain schools of psychotherapy which find
therapeutic value in narrative, inter-psychic truth that fits and is
therapeutically effective for a given patient under given conditions, regardless
of historical truth.105
104 Loftus, supra note 2, at 524.
105 Psychoanalyst Roy Schafer, for example, points out the divergence between the
traditional notion of psychoanalysis as an endeavor in search of truth, and his
conception of it as a creative narrative undertaking. Roy Schafer, Narration in the
Psychoanalytic Dialogue, in ON NARRATIVE 25 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1980).
Donald Spence, in a classic work on the subject, finds the search for historical truth
outside the competence of a therapist. In certain portions of his work he endorses
"narrative truth," where it may advance the work of therapy without departing in a
psychoanalytically significant way from what has emerged. See DONALD SPENCE,
NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL TRUTH: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS 160, 263-78 (1982).
It is doubtful that therapists oriented to narrative truth would invent or accept false
and devastating traumatic events as furthering their work. Aside from the probability
that radical untruth is outside the subtle variations of traditional narrative therapy, one
would hope that all therapists would deem it appropriate to consider moral and ethical
obligations to avoid unjustified injury to third parties.
In an authoritative reading of Donald Spence, Paul L. Wachtel explains Spence's
views as follows:
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Aside from the fact that it cannot be known whether a claimed recovered
memory was forgotten or was repressed, it is not clear that repression itself implies
a memory retained in intact condition, insulated and immune from ordinary distortive
processes of confabulation during the storage stage. A number of scholars question
the concept of uncontaminated storage of repressed memories. 106 Harvard
neurological-psychologist Daniel Schacter writes:
The idea of an unchanging imprint of exactly what happened at the
time of a trauma brings us perilously close to the dubious notion that
memory (or at least traumatic memory) is like a camcorder, preserving all
aspects of an episode. This idea is fundamentally misguided when
applied to ordinary experiences and . . . it doesn't work well for
traumatic episodes that people always remember. It would be surprising,
even extraordinary, if it were to apply to traumatic experiences that were
buried, and then recovered years later. There is currently no scientifically
credible evidence to support the idea.
107
Studies of combat amnesia and of flashbacks led Bowers and Farvolden to
conclude that accepting the concept of repression
does not commit theorists to the belief that recovered memories must
be historically accurate in all particulars. A memory, by virtue of having
been repressed, does not somehow escape the distortions and constructive
features of memories in general .... 10
While Freud, in his early writings, seemed to embrace a frozen image concept
of repression, 109 most authorities today have found little or no support for it.
If it holds together well, if it conveys a new understanding of the
patient's life that is persuasive to the patient and helps him gain a
greater feeling of coherence and a revisioning of his life story that
opens new possibilities, it is a good interpretation. That it is not the
one true story is not a flaw but a necessity. Our lives permit of many
narratives. Consequently, according to Spence, "it seems more appro-
priate to conceive of an interpretation as a construction a creative pro-
position-rather than as a reconstruction that is supposed to correspond
to something in the past."
PAUL L. WACHTEL, THERAPEUTIC COMMUNICATION: PRINCIPLES AND EFFECTIVE PRACTICE
188 (1993). On the concept of reframing as a moderate type of suggestion, see generally,
id. at 185-205.
For an extended treatment of Spence's work, see generally, Marianne Wesson,
Historical Truth, Narative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REv. 331 (1985).
106See, e.g., OFSHE & WAITERS, supra note 15. LOFrTus & KETCHUM, supra note 15, at
49-58.
107DAviD L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND AND THE PAST
at 263-66 (1996).
108Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 361.
109His early writings suggested that the image being frozen was one of actual abuse
but later he concluded that the buried material was of fantasies and drives in early
childhood.
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Paul L. Wachtel, a renowned theoretical clinician, observed that under Freud
and Breuer's theories, memories of traumatic events were encapsulated and
"remained fresh," retaining in an unmodified way, their original significance
and intensity.
Freud's description of the persisting influence of the past is reminiscent
of the tales of wooly mammoths found frozen in the Arctic ice, so
perfectly preserved after thousands of years that their meat could be
eaten by anyone with a taste for such regressive fare. Freud was
extremely impressed with the "freshness" and vividness of the
memories revealed after digging through layers of resistance. Their
lack of access to the usual associative pathways was seen as preserving
them.
110
One episode in the history of neurology is sometimes cited as support for
the permafrost/video recording Freudian notion of memory. An eminent
neurologist, Wilder Penfield, electronically stimulated certain areas of the
brains of patients awaiting surgery. He reported that his patients expressed
vivid recollections in graphic visual and other sensory imagery, of long
forgotten events. 111
It is submitted that the Penfield studies, as now understood, do not
constitute evidence to support the video recording/frozen "wooly mammoth"
notion of repression.
Penfield concluded that experiences leave permanent imprints on/in the
brain "as though a tape recorder had been receiving it all."112 Many
psychologists accepted Penfield's claim that everything that happens is
permanently stored in the mind. Popular opinion, as well as popular
introductory textbooks in psychology seemed to concur. But, aside from the
110PAUL L. WACHTEL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BEHAVIOR THERAPY at 28-29 (1977).
111WIDER PENFIELD & LAMAR ROBERTS, SPEECH AND BRAIN-MECHANISMS (1959).
Penfield's conclusions regarding memory storage are further elaborated in Wilder
Penfield & P. Perot, The Brain's Record of Auditory and Visual Experience, 86 BRAIN 595
(1963); and Wilder Penfield, Consciousness, Memory, and Man's Conditioned Reflexes, in,
ON THE BIOLOGY OF LEARNING 165 (K. Pribram ed., 1969).
Some scholars concluded that this episode suggests: "that whatever the exact
means of storage and the exact process of recall, there are ways in which some record
of past experiences can be stored for long periods of time without being subject to...
wearing or fusing of memory traces ......
WACHTEL, supra note 92, at 29.
Wachtel, while not addressing the recovered memory controversy, takes the view
that the concept of repression is important so far as understanding a patient's selective
memory and covered-up feelings, emotions, and various mental states. (repression of the
inner life). He also expresses concern regarding the number of practitioners who cling
to the "wooly mammoth" theory, focussing their work on material buried in the past
(whether or not memories of events), rather than attending to patterns of self-defeating
behaviors patients engage in currently in their relations to, and interactions with others.
See id. at 346-49.
112Penfield, supra note 111.
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fact that only 3.5 percent to 7.7 percent of Penfield's patients, forty patients in
all, reported any such mental experiences, 113 Penfieldfailed to document that any
of these experiences were memories of actual past events, rather than merely fantasies
or hallucinations.114
Moreover, a careful examination of the experiences reported by the forty
stimulation-responders, have led researchers to conclude that "at most the
electrically induced experiences were reconstructions or original
hallucinogenic experiences in and of themselves, 115 or dream-type synthetic
constructions [rather than] ... 'literal recalls.' "116 "A strong determinant of the
content of these memories is the patient's mental content at the time of
stimulation. These so-called memories then, appear to consist merely of the
thoughts and ideas that happened to exist just prior to and during the
stimulation."11 7
The "pristine," "frozen mammoth" hypothesis of repressed memories is
without scientific or systematized empirical evidence to support it.118 Research
has found no reason to believe that repressed memory "behaves" differently
from forgotten memories; the former are probably no more immune from
changes and distortions wrought by the confabulation process than the latter.
While researchers have definitively established that there are many
contaminants of ordinary memory, there is no conclusive way to establish, by
ethically conducted experiments, whether repressed memory of abuse is
subject to similar contaminants as ordinary forgetting and apparent
remembering. 119
113 See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Geoffrey R. Loftus, On the Permanence of Stored Information
in the Human Brain, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 409, 413 (1980).
114 See generally SCHACER, supra note 107, at 76-78.
115 Loftus & Loftus, supra note 113, at414. Nothing could be pinned down as a detailed,
concrete actual historical memory, and much was auditory, vague, or inconsistent with
actual history or not possible. (E.g., remembering one's own birth).
116ULRIcH NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 169 (1967).
117Loftus & Loftus, supra note 113, at 414.
118See, e.g., David S. Holmes, The Evidence for Repression: An Examination of Sixty Years
of Research, in REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION 85,96 (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990).
119Repression is in part such a problematic concept because it is impossible to
demonstrate experimentally in a laboratory setting. Any effort to do so-to generate real
trauma-would transgress the boundaries of ethics and morality. SCHACTER, supra note
108, at 272; Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97 at 359.
A study by David Holmes of sixty years of research failed to discover a single case
of authenticated repression: "there is no controlled laboratory evidence supporting the
conception of repression." Holmes, supra note 118, at 96. The study is not without its
critics, see, e.g., WACI-TEL, stupra note 92, at 133.
While the textual discussion suggests that there is little experimental evidence to
support the idea of repressed memory of historical events, the concept of repression of
emotions (e.g., fear, anger, sexuality) and other aspects of inner life plays an important
role in the most respectable contemporary therapies. See generally id. at 87, 131-140.
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Regarding the importance of the repression/pristine/"woolly mammoth"
theory to recovered memory proponents; if memories retrieved in therapy by
patients who presented with no such memory cannot be deemed reliable, at
least in its incest-recalling aspects, then a recovered memory practitioner
cannot justify his assumption that he has an incest survivor before him.
Given the absence of evidence, research support, or a strong theoretical or
neurological foundation, it is untenable for any practitioners to simply assume
the accuracy of apparent retrieved memories of CSA.
C. Retrieval/Recall
An issue which has concerned part of the repression/dissociation debate is
whether there is a difference in recallability between a single traumatic childhood
episode of sexual abuse, and a series of episodes of abuse? The significance of this
issue lies in the fact that a substantial majority of cases of apparent recovered
memories involves recollections of multiple episodes of molestation. Research
suggests that forgetting or repressing a single entire traumatic episode is rare.
Dr. Schacter points out that
felvidence concerning memory for real-life traumas in children and adults
indicates that these events-such as the Chowchilla kidnappings, the
sniper killing at an elementary school, or the collapse of skywalks at a
Kansas City hotel-are generally well-remembered. Some forgetting and
distortion occur but complete amnesia for these terrfying episodes is virtually
non-existent.12
6
Psychiatrist Lenore Terr argues that single traumatic events are readily
recalled, 121 but repeated episodes of trauma (e.g., a child subjected to many
instances of abuse by her father), tend to be dissociated and therefore
unavailable for recall. 122
There is considerable scholarship, however, that points in the opposite
direction regarding repeated exposure to traumatic experiences.
[H]undreds of studies have shown that repetition of information leads
to improved memory, not loss of memory... [P]rofound amnesia is
unlikely. People who have lived through repeated traumas in war
generally remember these terrifying experiences all too well.... [W]ith
120 SCHACTER, supra note 107, at 256.
Many limited amnesias, in which people fail to remember a traumatic
event such as committing a murder or being raped, are due to alcohol
intoxication, brain injury, loss of consciousness, or even deliberate
faking. There are only a few dramatic examples.., in which forgetting is
not easily attributable to those factors.
Id.
121 LoFrus & KErcHuM, supra note 15, at 57.
1 2 2 LENORE TERR, UNCHAINED MEMORIES: THE STORIES OF TRAUMATIC MEMORIES, LOST
AND FOUND 87-89 (1994).
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rare exceptions such as fugue states-which are generally of short
duration-people do not forget an entire set of repeated traumas.
123
Psychologists Lindsay and Read reviewing many studies of memory and
traumatic experiences conclude that
existing research on children's and adults' memory for physical
traumas, murders, natural disasters, and so on, suggests that memory
for trauma follows the same principles as memories for mundane events, and
that, because of their salience, traumatic events are more, rather than less,
likely to be remembered....
We do not claim that it is impossible for survivors of repeated contact
CSA to forget that they were abused. Rather, our point is that evidence
suggests that such forgetting is rare. Forgetting in ways that enable later
remembering is likely rarer still.
12 4
Regarding repeated sexual traumas, "the specific events become blurred in
memory and are difficult to separate from one another." 125 This kind of failure
to remember details of particular episodes would not
lead to amnesia for all the relevant experiences-the abused person
would still recall the general event of being abused. But blurring and
merging of details from repeated episodes might help explain why the
memories of sexual-abuse survivors are sometimes patchy and
incomplete. 
126
Dr. Terr, a leading scholarly figure supporting recovered memory work in
therapy, has, in her theoretical work, created an inconsistency that curiously
acknowledged that recovery of memory in therapy is extremely unlikely. Dr.
Terr has argued that single traumatic events are rarely forgotten, while a series
of traumatic events are so dissociated as to never enter the memory in the first
place and thus are unavailable for retrieval or recovery.127 Accordingly, any
clear or vivid memory purportedly retrieved during therapy is unlikely to
accurately reflect reality. 128
The critical question as to whether repressed CSA can be recalled is
answered, to the satisfaction of the advocates of recovered memory therapy, in
seven studies which purport to show that persons who had been victimized
12 3 SCHACrER, supra note 107, at 257.
124 D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, "Memory Work" and Recovered Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse: Scientific Evidence and Public, Professional and Personal Issues, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB_ POL'Y & L. 846, 855 (1995).
12 5 SCHACrER, supra note 107, at 259.
126Id.
127Among those who have pointed this out are Bowers and Farvolden, supra note 97,
at 358.
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did not remember their sexual victimization. In six of the studies, groups of
women who evidently remembered CSA were asked a variant of the question:
"was there a time when you didn't remember the abuse?" Various percentages of
respondents in these studies answered these questions affirmatively.129 From
this, some recovered memory therapists conclude that patients who have no
presenting memory of CSA may well be actual victims.
However, Lindsay and Read observed:
The most global criticism of these studies concerns the ambiguity of
the question respondents were asked, such as, 'Was there ever a time
when you could not remember some or all of the abuse?' . . . The
meaning of affirmative responses to this question is not clear: Were
respondents reporting periods during which they avoided thinking of the abuse
or periods during which they would have been unable to recall it if asked? ...
The question was phrased in different ways in different studies, but in
all cases it is unclear how well the question mapped on to complete
amnesia for a CSA history. Even if it is assumed that most respondents were
referring to complete amnesia for abuse histories rather than to avoidance,
forgetting of details, or forgetting of particular instances, questions can be
raised about people's ability to assess whether they would have been able to
remember CSA during a period of time when they claim not to have
remembered it.
130
It would seem self-evidently questionable to ask people who remembered
what they have forgotten to rely on their memory of their forgetfulness as proof
of profound forgetfulness or repression.
1291n six studies, people were asked if they had ever experienced a period during
which they could not remember CSA that they now remember. In Briere and Conte's
(1993) questionnaire study of 450 women whose therapists were part of a sexual abuse
treatment network, 59% of the 100% who reported CSA indicated that there had been
a period during which they were unable to remember the first instance of abuse. In
Loftus, Polonsky, and Fullilove's (1994) interview study of 105 women in a drug
rehabilitation program, 19% of the 54% who reported CSA indicated a prior period
during which they forgot the abuse. In Gold, Hughes, and Hohnecker's (1994) intake
interviews of an unspecified number of women in a sex abuse survivors' treatment
program, 30% of the (presumably) 100% who reported CSA indicated that there had
been at least a one-year period during which memories of the abuse were "completely
blocked out." In Sheiman's (1993) questionnaire study of 196 undergraduates, half of
the 12% who reported CSA indicated that there had been a period during which they
did not remember the abuse. In Feldman-Summers and Pope's (1994) questionnaire
study of 330 therapists, 41% of the 24% who reported CSA indicated that there had been
a period during which they could not remember some or all of the abuse. In Williams's
(1994) prospective study of 129 women with recorded histories of an instance of CSA,
12% of the 62% who reported the recorded instance when interviewed seventeen years
later indicated that there had been a period when they did not remember that instance
of abuse. Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 855 (materials cited therein).
130 d. (citations omitted).
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Indeed, problematic in several of these studies is their failure to indicate what
percentage of people purporting to recover memories of CSA experienced such
recovery in therapy.
A further problem with the Briere and Conte's ... study is that the
respondents were all in therapy. If some of their clinicians were under
the belief that repression of memory is common, they may have
communicated this belief to their clients. Clients could readily infer
that, if repression of memory is so common, it is likely to have
happened to them .... This would, of course, inflate the estimates of
the prevalence of repression.
131
The importance of this query is also based on the evidence that accurate
spontaneous recall, independent of therapy, of long buried or forgotten incidents
is possible; in such situations there is not the influence, and suggestiveness of recovered
memory therapy.132
The research most frequently cited by advocates of recovered memory
therapy is a study by psychologist Linda Meyer Williams. 133 The study,
conducted in 1990 and 1991, consisted of interviews and detailed questions of
129 women with previously documented histories of CSA.134 Thirty-eight
percent of the women (forty-nine) did not recall the reported abuse or any
abuse by the same perpetrator. Of those who did not recall the documented
incident, two-thirds recalled abuse by other perpetrators at other times;
one-third reported that they had never been abused (twelve percent of the total)
(sixteen). Many intriguing insights regarding relationships between
remembering, forgetting, identity of perpetrator, nature of abuse, age of victim,
etc., were advanced by Professor Williams.135 The implications of the study for
treatment and forensic issues, while not explored by Williams, have become a
bone of contention among those involved in the controversy.
Bowers and Farvolden ask about the Williams study:
Despite its superiority over strictly retrospective studies of child sexual
abuse, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent non-reported abuse
in the Williams study was due to repression-as distinct from ordinary
131Loftus, supra note 2, at 521 (1993).
132There have been a number of incidents of sudden spontaneous recall, several of which
have been corroborated, and some leading to criminal convictions of the childhood
molester. Butler, supra note 32; see also SCHACTEI, supra note 107, at 265. Lindsay and
Read observe, however, "if and when memory recovery is truly spontaneous there are
far fewer grounds for concern about false memories." Lindsay & Read, supra note 124,
at 847.
133Linda M. Williams, Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women's
Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL 1167 (1994).
134The documentation was in hospital records from emergency rooms in a major
Northeast city during the 1970s.
1351d. at 1174.
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forgetting, infantile amnesia, embarrassment at mentioning the abuse
incidents, and so on.
136
Moreover, there is no indication that those who could not remember documented
childhood abuse would ever remember.1 37 One must, as Professor Williams herself
cautions, take her findings as a modest beginning in the understanding of
memories of CSA.138 It surely does not support the notion that those who forgot
would ever remember, or that they would remember in therapy or that, if high
powered suggestiveness where used in therapy, what they remembered would
be sufficiently accurate (as to perpetrator and nature of the abuse) to be a basis
for abuse-survivor therapy and/or the making of an accusation (formal or
informal) against a purported perpetrator.
Lindsay and Read sum up the Williams study:
Williams did not indicate how many of the 12% who reported no abuse
history were under 4 years of age when the recorded instance occurred,
so we cannot estimate the extent to which [normal] infantile amnesia
contributed to these cases. William's results suggest that a substantial
minority of victims of CSA do not report a particular instance when
interviewed years later and that some survivors of a recorded instance
do not report any CSA when interviewed about their CSA histories
(probably because they do not recall the abuse). As Williams ... noted
however, the findings do not support the idea that a large percentage of people
with extensive histories of CSA are unaware that they ever experienced such
abuse.
139
Distinguished experimental psychologist and preeminent expert on
memory, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus comments: "Perhaps the best way to think about
the 38% in Williams sample who didn't remember is to say it simple. They don't
remember."140
If the present author may speculate, it may be that the women constituting
the relatively high percentage who could not remember the documented
instance of childhood sexual molestation, had been subject to a childhood
pervaded by a multitude of experiences, as victims and witnesses of trauma,
136Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 359 (citations omitted).
137Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Forgetting Sexual Trauma: What Does it Mean When 38%
Forget? 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1177, 1180 (1994) [hereinafter Forgetting
Sexual Trauma].
138Linda Meyer Williams, What Does It Mean to Forget Child Sexual Abuse? A Reply to
Loftus, Garry, and Feldman; 62 J. COUNSELING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1182, 1184 (1994).
139 Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 857. Because recovered memory therapy often
yields memories of repeated episodes of sexual abuses, and the 38% had prior to the
reported abuse not been abused, the Williams study may be more probative evidence
that a single episode, rather than a series of episodes may be forgotten.
140Forgetting Sexual Trauma, supra note 137, at 1179-80.
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abuse, and extreme stress. Such a history would tend to explain the inability to
recall a particular documented instance of sexual victimization.
The problem, most authorities conclude is not that victims of traumatic
experiences cannot remember, but that they cannot forget!
Why the concern over the profundity of the forgetting phenomenon,
whatever the label? Apparently because critics of recovered memory therapy
are concerned that if victimized patients could truly not remember it would
support the thesis of permafrost repression and lend credence to the claim that
recovered memories of once unremembered traumas are accurate.
Since there is no evidence to support the concept of a distortion-free storage
stage, even if one accepts the proposition that experiences can be so deeply
forgotten as to be immune to recall by ordinary triggers of remembrance, it is
simply a mistake to assume that a sudden insight, flashback, or cathartic experience is
self-validating.14 1
In any event, one can concede the possibility that memories once deeply
buried (whatever the label), whether insulated from confabulation or not, can
in some cases under certain circumstances be recalled with material
accuracy.142
The key point regarding purported recovered memories, is that there is no way to tell
whether they are accurate in their material respects. Where there is an apparent
recollection of CSA, one cannot tell whether it is significant distortion of an
innocuous or, at worst, ambiguous event. One cannot tell because there are so
many paths to material inaccuracy and significant distortion.
The "recall" might be illusory if repressed memories are subject to
confabulation in the storage period. The evident recollection might be illusory
because some original experience was received in a state of dissociation. The
ostensible memory might be substantially inaccurate if the ambiguous memory
was never completely forgotten, but in its partial awareness and partial
forgotten state was subject to a variety of distortive processes. It might be
inaccurate because the original trauma (perhaps different from the
remembered trauma) produced post traumatic stress disorder with attendant
distortive dissociative episodes.
Even if it could be said with some confidence that traumatic episodes when
forgotten could be repressed (in the pristine storage sense), it would not follow
that any particular ostensible recollection of a traumatic, sexually abusive episode
was acceptable proof of a repressed trauma, rather than a manifestation of
ordinary, albeit deep, forgetting, subject to numerous distortive processes over
the years.
141 Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 361.
142After all, confabulation does not necessarily refer to processes so distortive as
always to transform the underlying historical experience into an eventually
remembered experience that is fundamentally false. Confabulation during storage may
well affect only certain peripheral details, but leave the essentials of the original
traumatic experience basically consistent with reality.
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Finally, even assuming that a memory of a traumatic event can sometimes
be stored in a frozen, unchanged condition, such a repressed memory would
be highly resistant to making a "public appearance," i.e., by manifesting itself
in the patient's consciousness. It would seem to follow that the powerful cueing
necessary to coax that memory out of its hibernating cocoon may well have a
substantial distortive effect on what eventually comes to surface. 143
Given that: a) it is not known whether there is a confabulation-immune
memory storage process; b) it cannot be determined whether a particular
ostensible memory is actually the product of such a process or has one of
several alternative explanations; and c) regarding any truly intact memory in
deep storage (if such there ever be) the process of recovery maybe significantly
distortive, a therapist must rationally acknowledge that he or she is simply in the dark
concerning the accuracy of a "recovered memory."
The readiness of some therapists to accept purported memories as
self-authenticating, self-validating, and by virtue of their content
unquestionably true is very troubling. Only some combination of an extreme
confirmatory bias, denial, rationalization, unchecked premises, and willful
blindness can begin to explain the untenable disregard of reason and research.
These distortive processes contaminating therapeutic objectivity and openness
may well be rooted in deeply felt sympathy for survivors of sexual abuse but
they fail to advance the objective of treating actual victims of CSA.
Whatever the reliability or validity of recovered memory therapy, sexual
abuse of children is one of the gravest hidden evils of society; it is the most
contemptible form of exploitation of the helpless and vulnerable; it reflects an
awful callousness, a complete absence of empathy or conscience; and it causes,
in many victims, untold distress. It may produce emotional and interpersonal
turmoil throughout their lives, creating psychic pain, dysfunctional behavior,
and severely burdened efforts to get on with ordinary living.144 Perhaps
because it is a hidden evil with deleterious emotional consequences, most often
perpetrated against female children, there is such a powerful desire by many
therapists to expose it.
Some conclusions, drawn from materials herein, can now be drawn from a
consensus of considered opinions.
* People who are sexually abused in the first few years of life are unlikely
to ever remember the experience(s).
* People are unlikely to forget traumatic events occurring after the age of
three or four.
" A single traumatic episode is much more likely to be remembered than
profoundly forgotten, but there have been some documented instances
of long delayed accurate recollection.
143 See generally ScHACTER, supra note 107, at 180.
144J. McCaule et al., Clinical Characteristices of Women With a History of Childhood Abuse,
27 JAMA 1362 (1997).
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* Regarding multiple traumatic episodes, particular aspects of any
episode may be forgotten, but the existence of the stream of such
episodes, is likely to be remembered.
" Therefore, it is a rare case in which a person will forget being traumatized in
childhood (at a time subsequent to the ages of normal childhood amnesia).
Thus,
"Only a very small percentage of people have hidden histories of CSA that they
could recover through memory work.'145
Where a person does appear to recall for the first time, experiencing trauma
years earlier, the accuracy of such recollection is at least an open question, if
not more suspect than not. No scientific method has been developed for
determining whether such an apparent recollection is accurate or illusory
An additional proposition to be elaborated below is that:
* The probability of an inaccurate or induced or implanted memory-a
false memory or pseudomemory, is considerably increased by a therapist's
utilization of highly suggestive, heavy-handed techniques of retrieval, as well
as by several other socio-psychological and therapist-patient relational
factors.
VI. RISKING INDUCEMENT OF FALSE MEMORIES OF ABUSE
In suits by patients against alleged abusers, suits brought after expiration of
the statute of limitations, the profundity of recollection impairment (whatever
the label) is indeed an issue.
The critical question for any suit by a falsely accused person against a
recovered memory therapist is, however, "what are the conditions surrounding
the memory retrieval process that make it likely that false memories will be
induced?" The process of retrieval within the consulting rooms of recovered
memory therapists, will be explored for its possible effects on the authenticity
of recovered memories. The concern is with purported recoveries of memory
in situations involving gross and irresponsible suggestiveness on the part of
therapists.146 No lawsuit seems justified where the patient has or purports to
have, recollections of CSA prior to, or absent, suggestive communications in
therapy, or even where some normal, typical professional observations and
interpretations and inquiries have moderately suggestive tendencies. Only
145See Lindsay & Read supra note 124, at 861-62 (1995).
We do not claim that it is impossible for survivors of repeated contact
CSA to forget that they were abused. Rather, our point is that evidence
suggests that such forgetting is rare. Forgetting in ways that enable
later remembering is likely rarer still. Together, these findings and
arguments imply that only a very small percentage of people have
hidden histories of CSA that they could recover through memory work.
Id.
146 Professors Bowman and Mertz express disapproval of such practices, but question
the frequency of employment of such techniques, supra note 7. Compare, however
Lindsay & Read, supra note 124.
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where the therapist creates substantial risks of engendering false memories and false
accusations of atrocious crimes by misuse of powerfully suggestive techniques is a legal
cause of action being recommended.147
A. Untenable Diagnostic Assumptions of Recovered Memory Therapy
The initial difficulty, the predicate of a creation of a high risk of false
memories of abuse, is in the diagnostic judgment. Notwithstanding
authoritative observations that there are no strong diagnostic indicia justifying
a conclusion of CSA (absent the patient's unprompted memory of some or all
of it), recovered memory clinicians insist that they can recognize the symptoms
in their patients.
While some of the popular books on sexual abuse have checklists of
symptoms too numerous to enumerate, 14 8 the 'bible" of the movement, The
Courage to Heal by Ellen Bass and Laura Davis advises therapists that "[i]f sexual
abuse isn't the presenting problem but your client has eating disorders, an
addiction to drugs or alcohol, suicidal feelings, or sexual problems, these may
be symptoms of sexual abuse."149 This book and others along similar lines are
often recommended by recovered memory therapists to their patients.
According to Dr. Sadoff, some recovered memory therapists believe:
that all patients who have eating disorders or experience sexual dysfunction
must have been sexually abused as youngsters. 15 Sometimes, these
therapists will communicate this message directly to the patient....
"You have symptoms which we know, from research, have been caused
by early sexual abuse. You do not have those memories now, but through
therapy I will help you uncover those memories so you can be helped." This
is an outrageous statement yet a number of therapists believe it is helpful....
the therapist ignores the real cause of the symptoms, insuring that the
147 Borrowing one authority's taxonomy, the cause of action recommended herein is
only in category four of the following list, and even then in only extreme cases:
"1) cases in which someone knows and has known all along that he or she was abused;
2) cases in which someone independently remembers repressed memories; 3) cases in
which a therapist facilitates recall of repressed memories; 4) cases in which a therapist
suggests memories of abuse." YAPKO, supra note 15, at 31.
148See, e.g., E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND rrs
AFrEREFFECrS IN WOMEN (1990). Some of the "symptoms of childhood sexual abuse
mentioned on a thirty-four item checklist are compulsive behavior, gastrointestinal
problems, headaches, eating disorders, drug or alcohol abuse, "feeling different,"
stealing, guilt, low self-esteem." Also suggested as indications are needing to tell secrets,
inability to take risks, fear of losing control, and having "difficulty with water hitting
the face." Id. at xviii-xxi, xix, 198-99.
149BASS & DAVIS, supra note 94, at 849.
150 Dr. Sadoff points out that bulimia maywellbe rooted in demands of perfectionism
placed on the patient as a child; sexual dysfunction might be rooted in a strict religious
upbringing. And many other etiologies could be explanatory of such conditions. Sadoff,
supra note 38, at 80.
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patient will not get the help she needs. [Moreover] ... the therapist
posits a false cause, resulting in the patient battlin sfor years with
family and friends over events that never happened.
According to most authoritative commentators, there are no firm, reliable
strong diagnostic indicia 152 of CSA. Regarding adult sexual dysfunction,
believed by some abuse therapists to be such an indicator: "sexual dysfunction
is also associated with a variety of other background factors.'153
The assertions regarding the diagnostic significance of eating disorders as
indicative of childhood sexual victimization have also been contradicted by
recent studies. 154
1511d. at 82-83.
A second group of therapists are more subtle. They will indicate to
the patient that she may or may not have suffered early sexual abuse,
stating that the answer to this question will be uncovered in therapy.
The suggestion, however, hangs heavily in the air waiting for the trans-
ference process to take over.
A third group will often ask leading questions, such as, "Have you
ever been sexually abused as a youngster?" or "What are your earliest
memories of sexual contact within your family?" A perceptive patient
often understands that there is an inference that she was abused. Again,
the process of transference can give rise to memories that are false.
A fourth group will recommend books to the patient to read, such
as, The Courage to Heal, which tells these young women that if they
think they have been abused then they have been abused. The book
also names consulting lawyers and doctors who can assist in pursuing
a legal remedy.
I am sure these therapists do not know the harm they cause.
Id. at 82-83.
152Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 863.
153Debra A. Poole et al., Psychotherapy and the Recovery of Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse: U.S. and British Practitioners' Opinions, Practices, and Experiences, 63 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL 426,435 (1995) (citations omitted).
154See Marcia Rorty et al., Childhood Sexual, Physical, and Psychological Abuse in Bulimia
Nervosa, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1122,1122 (1994); Johann Kinzel et al., Family Background
and Sexual AbuseAssociated with Eating Disorders, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1127,1130 (1994)
(childhood sexual abuse was "neither necessary nor sufficient for the latter development
of an eating disorder").
A recent statement by the Canadian Psychiatric Association declares:
certain therapists... use a list of symptoms that are said to indicate
the likelihood of individuals having been abused. Common symptoms
such as depression, anxiety, anorexia or overeating, poorly explained
pains, and other bodily complaints have all been used as proof of
alleged sexual abuse. There is no support for such propositions.
Psychotherapy based on these assumptions may lead to deliterious
effects. Increases in self-injury and suicide attempts have been
reported in some patients given recovered memory treatment.
June 1996 Position Statement, supra note 93.
[Vol. 11:45
1996-97] THERAPISTS'LIABILITY TO FALSELY ACCUSED 85
Dr. Elizabeth Loftus puts it most cogently: "If everything is a sign of past
childhood abuse, then nothing is.' 155
A psychologist who bases conclusions on profoundly inadequate evidence
and unscientific preconceptions is acting unprofessionally, substituting zeal for
open-mindedness. There are few more obvious logical fallacies than the notion
that: if A (e.g. childhood sexual abuse) produces B (a variety of emotional and
functional disabilities) then where B is found, A must be the cause. (To act on
such a fallacy is equivalent to a physician concluding that if a patient complains
of headaches, she must have a brain tumor.)
Even with authoritative knowledge of the most probable emotional and
behavioral consequences of CSA, 156 one cannot rationally diagnose sexual
abuse if the cluster of presenting symptoms is substantially consistent with
other etiological explanations. 157 Yet such unscientific diagnostic conclusions
may be the instrument that significantly contributes to the patient's ultimately
embracing erroneous beliefs and false memories.
This author has examined a large sample of the recovered memory literature
and has failed to find (although it might exist in some obscure comer) any
recommendation (with one exception)158 that even where a patient presents
with an apparent partial or complete memory of CSA, the therapist must not
automatically accept the patient's assertion 159 as a premise on which to build,
but rather should suspend judgment 60 and await developments in the course
of open-minded therapeutic techniques.
B. Suggestive Aspects of Recovered Memory Therapy
1. Situational Factors
A patient may undertake therapy for an almost infinite number of reasons
related to distress, unhappiness, failed relationships, or other perceived failures
155Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Repressed Memory Controversy, 49 AM. PSYCHOL. 443, 444
(May, 1994) [hereinafter Repressed Memory Controversy].
156American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of
Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918 (1985) [hereinafter Scientific
Status of Refreshing Recollection].
157
"CSA is associated with many adulthood psychological problems but some people with CSA
histories do not have those symptoms, and many people who have those symptoms do not have
CSA histories." Lindsay & Read, supra note 118, at 863.
158 See HERMAN, supra note 101.
159
"[U]ncritical acceptance of every single claim of sexual abuse, no matter how
dubious, is bound to have an unintended and tragic consequence: trivializing the true
and ruthless cases of abuse and increasing the suffering of genuine victims." Loftus, supra note
2.
160Freud recommended that psychoanalysts approach a patient with "evenly
suspended attention" . in the face of all that one hears." RECOMMENDATIONS TO
PHYSICIANS PRnCTIING PSYCHOANALYSIS (1912) (quoted in JANET MALCOLM,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, THE IMPOSSIBLE PROFESSION 26 (1982)).
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or behavioral difficulties. She feels that she is in need of help and that therapy
can provide that help. Often, she enters therapy in some degree of emotional
fragility and vulnerability.
Putting her faith in the therapist, the patient often forms an emotional
attachment to her. She may give considerable credence to the therapist's
interpretations or suggestions.161 The patient's emotional survival may
depend on the success of the therapy. The therapist may be, in the mind of the
patient, a last best hope for resolving intolerable emotional, inter-personal or
psycho-social burdens and crises. She needs to believe in the healing powers
of the therapist, to place her faith in the therapist,162 sometimes a faith akin to
blind religious faith.
There may develop a transference relationship 163 to the therapist, a
repetition of a strong attachment the patient once had to a childhood figure or
even a powerful figure in adulthood. In "the transference," the therapist
becomes, in the eyes of the patient, the source of love and wisdom, the
omniscient provider of answers, and the one who cares deeply and
affectionately for the patient and her well-being. There is, in any event, a
marked imbalance in power and authority in the relationship.
In view of these phenomena, the patient is ordinarily receptive to even hints
by a therapist of the underlying problem or cause. When a therapist begins
hinting, strongly hinting, if not explicitly suggesting, that the patient's
problems originate in childhood sexual victimization, the patient, seeking a
cure and wanting to please the therapist and meet his expectations, will look
hard in the suggested direction. Along with the directed search for memories
may be the realization that incest victim status is socially acceptable today
(rather than stigmatic) and can elicit many sources of supportive attention. At
a subconscious level, finding an external cause for his or her distress may
relieve a patient of feelings of personal responsibility or blame.164 Moreover,
1610r she may resist them for some time, and even reject proffered interpretations.
16 2 See, e.g., OFSHE & WATrERS, supra note 15, at 111.
163See, e.g., Sadoff, supra note 38, at 81-82.
During the course of therapy, a patient who wishes to please her
therapist will often provide information the patient believes the
therapist wants to hear. For example, when therapists write notes
about a patient's dreams, the patient will often share more dream
material because, at some level, the patient recognizes that the
therapist is interested in dream productions. Similarly, when the
therapist appears to be interested in early memories which may
relate to recurrent symptomatology, the patient will often "find"
early memories.
Id.
164There is another factor contributing to the broad acceptance of
recovered memories of sexual abuse-the newfound readiness of
many people to identify themselves as victims and the readiness by
others to accept, endorse and even sanctify that identity....
To have been made a victim, or to be a member of a victimized group,
was once a stigma. Now it is more likely to be cited as the central
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the apparent memory may serve as a screen memory covering up authentic
memories of even more painful, actual events or feelings. There may also be
some existing alienation toward family members having nothing to do with
(non-existent) CSA.
According to Harvard psychiatrist Dr. Judith Herman (a respected
proponent of incest survivor therapy) an actual incest survivor may be least
trusting of a therapist and most resistant to confronting the fact of her
childhood sexual victimization. 165
Such an observation ironically fortifies the concerns expressed herein. For it
implies that it takes heavier cueing, and a more suggestive search for truth to uncover
actual victimization. Yet such techniques are even more likely to induce non-abused,
and thus more trusting, less-resistent patients to generate specious memories.166
The therapist, by one or more of the techniques examined below, persuades
the patient to remember episodes of sexual abuse. Once a patient sets out to
find such a memory, ordinary processes by which people find what they are
expecting and needing to find, take over. Doubts are "reasoned" away.
Ambiguous fragments of memory (my fatherbathed me, my father hugged me
once for an extra long time, my brother slapped me on the rump after I won
the hundred yard dash) become hostage to the confirmatory bias in which
neutral behaviors are interpreted as sexually abusive.
With a powerful cheering section encouraging production of incest
memories, and disapproval, in words or silence, confronting denial of such
memories, 167 even if other highly suggestive techniques were not used, it
would not be surprising to discover that the therapist's expectations of
recovered memories of CSA were met.
Some recovered memory therapists, as we shall see, tend to impose their
preconceived agenda on patients, and will simply not take no for an answer.168
explanation for a person's difficulties in life and as a justification
for receiving special understanding and even compensation from
those who have not been similarly victimized.
Walter Reich, The Monster in the Mists, N.Y. TnMES, May 15, 1994 at Section 7 (Book
Review).
165 See HERMAN, supra note 101, at 138-39, 148.
166 See generally SCHACrER, supra note 107, at 80. The situation is reminiscent of a
paradox in the entrapment defense: The extent of police prompting and enticing
necessary to induce criminal behavior in a wary person, albeit predisposed to
criminality, may have to be so great as to also induce an otherwise innocent person to
commit crime.
167Cf. Campbell, supra note 64.
168 practioners of recovered memory therapy sometimes make the illogical leap from
the fact of societal denial of widespread child sexual abuse to the conclusion that patients
who reject suggestions of their own victimization must be "denying" their personal
history.
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Indeed, they
concern themselves almost entirely with means of reinforcing incest
suspicions, not with means of checking them against solid evidence
pro or con. Their advice ... is: "never cast doubt on ... [your] suspicions
[of incestuous abuse]." [In the words of Renee Fredickkson, a prominent
recovered memory therapist] "You may be convinced that your
disbelief is a rational questioning of the reality versus unreality of your
memories, but it is partially a misguided attempt to repress the
memories again.''
69
They may convey to a patient who claims no memory of childhood abuse that
she is "denying," or is repressing "in denial" of the reality of childhood
incestuous victimization.
Examples abound in the literature. One of the leading contributors to such
literature is prominent psychologist Christine Courtois, who writes:
In order to conduct effective incest therapy, the therapist must
absolutely accept that incest occurs and that children are used and
exploited by their adult caretakers. They must continually counter the
personal tendency to defend the adult at the expense of the child or to
otherwise deny, discount or dismiss the survivor's story. They must
also abandon... [perspectives] which reinforce denial. 170
In other words don't take no for an answer. Bowers and Farvolden observe:
"therapists who are guided by a commitment to the traumatic origin of adult
neurosis readily infer repression of abuse from a patient's resistance to such a proposal.
In other words, the inability to recall abuse becomes evidence that it occurred."171
Dr. Herman, immediately after cautioning against unduly suggestive
practices, nevertheless writes:
From the outset, the therapist should place emphasis on the
importance of truth-telling and full-disclosure, since the patient is
likely to have many secrets, including secrets from herself. The
therapist should make clear that the truth is a goal constantly to be
striven for, and that while difficult to achieve at first, it will be attained
more fully in the course of time.
172
16 9 FREDERICK CREWS, THE MEMORY WARS 195 (1995).
17 0 CHRISTINE COURTOIS, HEALING THE INCEST WOUND 231 (1988).
171 Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 368.
17 2 HERMAN, supra note 101, at 148. Perhaps the single most telling fact pointing to
presuppositional attitudes is that throughout Dr. Herman's work, the patient, who is
often uncertain of the basis of her symptomology, is often referred to as "the survivor."
This is by no means to suggest that the quoted material recommends approaches
so hypersuggestive they could justify liability under this author's proposed statutory
cause of action.
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Therapists who simply assert "denial!" when a patient rejects a proffered
theory are effectively making a mockery of a psychodynamic concept of real
importance, but only when used under appropriate circumstances and in a
much more subtle way.
Consider the observations of Professor Paul L. Wachtel, again, not explicitly
concerned with recovered memory theory.
The useful directive [to therapists] that vigorous protest by a patient
that he does not feel or wish something may be an indication that he
really does but is conflicted, can be used by a clinician to "prove" that his
every wild guess or hunch is correct; either the patient acknowledges the
accuracy of the interpretation or he denies it, thereby "confirming" it.
This heads-I-win, tails-you-lose approach, however, is a caricature of the
original clinical observation, not a legitimate application of it.... Even a
particularly vigorous denial would not itself be sufficient evidence. If,
for example, the patient were reacting to the therapist's continuing to push a
pet interpretation that has been rejected several times before, his high-volume
denial would be an appropriate reaction and not a signal to place a bet on the
therapist's hobby horse.
When expectations and verbal suggestion are accompanied by some of the
techniques discussed below, the risk of producing a pseudomemory is
substantial. These techniques reinforce the persuasive power of the factors
described earlier by altering the patient's mental state with hypnosis or drugs,
encouraging imaginative visualization of childhood molestation, putting the
patient (who has not "acknowledged" childhood victimization) in an incest
survivor's group, or by other profoundly persuasive processes.
Therapists specializing in memory recovery are sometimes psychologically
preoccupied with incestuous abuse. They are in the business of finding it and
treating it. As one insightful article observes: "It is psychologically [easy]...
to get caught up in a confirmatory bias and to overlook or dismiss the
possibility that one has implicitly engendered observations, which are then
accepted as independent confirmation of one's views."174
Notwithstanding the questionable ethicality and dubious therapeutic value
of hypersuggestive techniques, there is room for moderately suggestive
approaches, based on traditional and legitimate practices. It is not suggestion
as such that warrants legal concern, for suggestion is unavoidable in therapy.175
Whatever the "purist" conception of a suggestion-free therapy might be,
suggestion of some sort or another has been used since Freud.176
1 7 3 WACHTEL, supra note 92, at 134.
174Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 371.
175
"It is impossible to engage in suggestion-free psychotherapy .... Bowers &
Farvolden, supra note 97, at 369.
Suggestion's least imposing form is inquiring whether a particular interpretation
tallies with a patient's current feelings. Cf. WACHTEL, supra note 105, at 179.
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2. Hypersuggestive Practices
" Bibliotherapy.
• Hypnosis, drugs, and age regression.
" Creative imagining (guided imagery; visualization).
* Support (persuasion) groups.
* Inducement and interpretation of sexualized dreams.
* Leading and directive verbal cues.
* Interpretations that directly or indirectly assert or assume CSA.
" Questions that contain implicit or explicit factual premises.
" Positive emotional feedback (rewards) for "right" answers, negative
emotional feedback for "wrong" answers.
a. Hypnosis and Drugs
Many therapists have profoundly erroneous beliefs about hypnosis. To
illustrate;
In a survey of 869 therapists, seventy-five percent thought hypnosis was able
to produce accurate recall when other methods were not successful, forty-seven
percent agreed that "[tiherapists can have greater faith in details of a traumatic
event when obtained hypnotically than otherwise, [and] almost one-third
accepted the myth that a "memory of trauma while in hypnosis must be true. "177
(Twenty-seven percent did not believe that hypnosis could generate false
memories.)
The widespread faith in hypnosis as a tool for recovering memories is
contrary to research evidence. 178 Indeed, two researchers have characterized
the beliefs reported in the above study as "truly alarming misconceptions about
human memory and about the safety and efficacy of hypnosis as a technique
for remembering childhood events ... ,.179
Under hypnosis, a patient is hypersuggestible and hypercompliant.
Therapists' cues are readily accepted. Usually the subject will try to please the
hypnotist, providing the behavior, beliefs, memories, or experience the
therapist, directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, seeks.
A person under hypnosis is as likely to fantasize, to have erroneous
memories, to confabulate, as to remember accurately. Such confabulation is an
imaginative creation of details to make the fantasy more believable. Often what
is produced is a combination of true and imagined events. 180
176 See Wachtel, supra note 105, at 179; Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 369-72.
177 See YAPKO, supra note 15.
178 See, e.g., Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection, supra note 156.
179Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 873.
180 See discussion in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, n.17 59-60 (1987) (striking down a
state's per se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony as applied to a criminal
defendant).
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Psychologists Bowers and Farvolden note that the experience of being
deeply hypnotized will more often than not "misrepresent and distort
history."181
[Tihe use of hypnosis and hypnosis-like techniques (e.g. relaxation, body work,
and guided imagery) to recover memories of abuse should cease and desist.
The danger of suggesting false but compelling memories of abuse is real, and
there is no way to discriminate false from true memories without
leaving the consulting room and doing a great deal of detective
work.... 182
The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs took the position, regarding hypnosis
"that recollections obtained during hypnosis can involve confabulations and
pseudomemories and not only fail to be more accurate, but actually appear to
be less reliable than nonhypnotic recall."183 To the extent the hypnotist makes
strong suggestions, implicit or explicit, the danger of false feedback is even
greater.
In terms of the law regarding hypnosis, a majority of jurisdictions follow a
rule of per se inadmissibility regarding testimony about matters remembered
for the first time under hypnosis.184 Many other courts hold that the party
offering hypnotically-refreshed testimony has the burden of demonstrating, by
clear and convincing evidence, that inter alia, no suggestive comments were
made while the subject was under hypnosis.185
b. Guided Imagery and Visualization
This recommended technique directs the patient to imagine:
that you were sexually abused, without worry about accuracy, proving
anything or having your ideas make sense. As you give rein to your
imagination, let your intuition guide your thoughts.... What kind of
things are happening? Is there one or more person with you? Male or
female? What types of touch are you experiencing? What parts of your
body are involved? What do you see, feel or hear? How do you feel
emotionally? Angry, scared, excited, confused? Once the patient
reflects on answers to these questions, Maltz recommends that the
therapist proceed by asking: "Who would have been likely
perpetrators? When were you most vulnerable to sexual abuse in your
181 Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 124, at 369.
1821d.; see also Loftus, supra note 2, at 521 ('There is extensive literature seriously
questioning the reliability of hypnotically enhanced memory").
183 Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection, supra note 156.
184 See Murray, supra note 7, at 518. For an excellent review of the history and current
status of the law regarding hypnotically refreshed testimony, see generally id. at 515-19.
185 Such courts follow the leading case of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
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life? Why would it have been important for you to forget what
happened? 18 6
Some recovered memory experts "openly suggest ... that the process of
discovering sexual abuse begins with the patient out and out imagining the
abuse."1 87 In a recent study, a significant percentage of subjects who were asked
to imagine certain events or objects were likely to subsequently include those
events or objects in their verbalized recollections of reality.188 This research
tends to show, as other scholars have opined, that imagination exercises such as
guided imagery create a high risk of generating, rather than retrieving, "memories" of
CSA.
c. Use of "Support" Groups
Patients including those who have not [yet?] had memories of CSA are urged
by some recovered memory therapists to join incest survivor groups. While
these groups can be powerful support and recovery mechanisms for actual
incest victims, a non-victim is exposed to a process akin to religious conversion.
Strong social pressure encourages recollection of incest. Support becomes
encouragement, becomes persuasion, becomes urging, becomes insisting, that
the patient produce details of her incestuous victimization. If and when she
does, she is rewarded by praise, empathic understanding, and other forms of
support.
Participants in these groups are searching together for past traumas,
dedicated to recovering and relating new memories of abuse.
Consider the following description by Dr. Judith Herman:
The group provides a powerful stimulus for the recovery of
traumatic memories. As each group member reconstructs [his or] her
own narrative, the details of [the] story almost inevitably evoke new
recollections in each of the listeners. In the incest survivor groups,
virtually every member who has defined a goal of recovered memories has been
able to do so....
Women who feel stymied by amnesia are encouraged to tell as much of their
story as they do remember. Invariably the group offers a fresh emotional
perspective that provides a bridge to new memories. In fact, the new
memories often come too fast. At times it is necessary to slow the
186 See OFSHE & WATTERS, supra note 15, at 92-93 (describing recommendations of
recovered memory experts).
1871d. at 93.
188 Cristine Russell, Suggestion Said to Fuel 'Imagination Inflation,' WASH. PosT, Feb. 25,
1997, at Zil.
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process down in order to keep it within the limits of the individual's
and the group's tolerance.
189
Beyond the unacceptable degrees of suggestion and persuasion (if not
coercion) imposed by some "support" groups, recent findings tend to show that
memories are "contagious"-that people in groups will sometimes remember
each other's remembered experiences. 190 Such findings tend to support the
notion that false memories can be generated in group experiences.
d. Communications by Therapist
Merely on the basis of a suggestive history or set of symptoms, some
therapists tell patients they definitely had a traumatic experience. Thereafter
the therapist strongly encourages the patient to pursue such memories. 191
Some therapists who practice incest detection make statements such as: "Your
symptoms sound like you've been abused when you were a child. What can
you tell me about that?... You sound to me like the sort of person who must
have been sexually abused. Tell me what the bastard did to you. " 192
C. Inducement of Illusory Memories
The fact that several hundred patients have recanted their accusations, some
of whom have sued their therapists, tends to show that false memories were
engendered.193 The number of known retractors suggests that an untold
number of pseudo memories have been induced.
Some recovered memory therapists persuade a patient who remembers
some type of abuse from a particular, non-incestuous source, that s/he was
more severely victimized and that the perpetrator was a close family member.19 4
"In numerous autobiographical accounts by patients, the patient with no
memories is convinced by the therapist that abuse is likely; [thereafter] the
189HERMAN, supra note 101, at 224.
190Philip Cohen, Thanks for the Memories, 153 NEW SCIENTIST 12 (Feb. 22, 1997).
191 See Loftus, supra note 2, at 526.
1921d.
193 Butler, supra note 32, at 36.
Recantations do not conclusively prove false memories, since all one knows is that
people had the memories and then recanted. One cannot know, in any particular case
if the memory was true or false or if the recantation was consciously or subconsciously
motivated by factors other than falsity of the memory.
Nevertheless, the techniques reported by many retractors, some in testimony,
strongly suggest that false memories are often induced. Indeed, in these cases there has
been no corroboration of the memories of abuse.
194A 1995 study by a prominent psychiatrist of forty retractors initially presenting
with memories of some sexual abuse by a step-brother, stranger, or distant family
member, were led to accuse innocent fathers or to remember murders sometimes in
Satanic rituals. See H.I. Lief & J.M. Fetkewicz, Retractors of False Memories: The Evolution
of Pseudomemories, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 411 (1995).
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patient obligingly uses reconstructive strategies to generate memories that
would support that conviction."195
In a remarkable case, Paul Ingram 196 was arrested for child abuse and was
pressured by detectives and a psychologist to admit his crimes. Eventually he
began to confess to rapes, assaults, child sexual abuse, and participation in a
Satan-worshipping cult that was said to have murdered twenty-five infants.
Whenever an act of abuse was suggested to him, he would initially be unable
to recall such abuse, then after making an effort, would supply a detailed
memory.
Dr. Richard Ofshe, a social psychologist on the case, fabricated a story and
related it to Ingram, to the effect that Ingram had forced his children to have
sexual relations with each other in front of him. When Ingram couldn't
remember, Ofshe asked him to imagine the scene and see it happening.
Thereafter Ingram wrote an extended confession, supplying graphic detail
about the event that never occurred.
Studies where patients remembered the most improbable ritual abuse show
that most of the "victims" had no memory of the abuse before the therapy, but
hypersuggestive techniques generated such memories. 19 7
While conceding the possibility of cases in which a patient has actually
forgotten real abuse, as well as the possibility that in some such cases suggestive
procedures might help such patients recover their memories, Dr. Schacter
observes that "unless a therapist can cite evidence that a specific memory-retrieval
technique enhances accurate recall without promoting false recollections, it is
inappropriate to continue to use unproven and potentially hazardous memory-retrieval
techniques."198
Dr. Schacter also observes that while no conclusive scientific proof
demonstrates that false memories are creatable by suggestive techniques
(noting that ethical studies could not be designed to prove or disprove the
proposition) "several separate strands, when considered together, support the
conclusion that some therapists have helped to create illusory recollections of sexual
abuse.199
He cites the following "strands:"
* the experimentally documented malleability of memory in response to
suggestive influences;
* evidence that hypnosis can produce compelling but inaccurate
pseudomemories;
" failures to document satanic ritual abuse;
195 Loftus, supra note 2, at 528.
196See WRIGHT, supra note 15.
1971d. at 528.
198SCHACTER, supra note 107, at 272-73 (1996).
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" recoveries of memories for seemingly impossible events (past lives and
alien abductions);
* growing numbers of therapy patients who have retracted their
memories;
* the constructive nature of memories for emotional events; and
* the risky memory-retrieval techniques advocated by some proponents
of recovered memory therapy.
200
Patients of recovered memory therapists have also claimed to remember
incidents at times of infancy and very young childhood, times which
authoritative research has long shown is either not remembered or inaccessible
to memory.201 Indeed, the founder of the British False Memory Society, Roger
Scotford, was accused of tickling his daughter's clitoris when she was nine
months old, based on her "recovered memory."202
Some writers, such as Bowman and Mertz, imply that suggestive memory
work is a rarity.203 But there is considerable data to the contrary.204 Indeed
estimates are that "many thousands of patients" are exposed to
hypersuggestive techniques designed to recover buried memories of CSA. 205
In terms of the frequency of therapy-generated illusory memories, Dr.
Schacter observes that while we do not know with certainty, "Tilt seems unlikely
... that they can all be written off to just a handful of wayward therapists."206 "Risky
therapeutic practices," Dr. Schacter declares, "need to be stopped."207
If an intensely emotional experience is brought about, some recovered
memory therapist believe it reflects truth, even though there is no independent
corroboration of it,208 and even though that belief has been rejected by a
number of authorities.
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., Isabelle Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Recovered Memories of
Alleged Sexual Abuse: Lawsuits Against Parents, 10 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 483, 489 (1992);
Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 856.
20 2Paul Valley, Accused, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 16, 1996, at 8.
203 See, e.g., Bowman & Mertz, supra note 7, at 613.
204 0ne major study concluded, "these findings argue against suggestions by clinicians
that clinicians who focus on memory recovery represent a minority culture within the
United States. Poole et al., supra note 153, at 433. See also Lindsay and Read, concluding,
after examining studies and other evidence, that "a nontrivial minority" of practioners
focus on searching for hidden histories of childhood sexual abuse in their clients.
Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 851-52.
205 Lindsay & Read, supra note 124, at 852.
2 0 6 SCHACTER, supra note 107, at 272-73.
2071d. at 277.
208 Bowers & Farvolden, supra note 97, at 367.
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One scholar noted, for example, with regard to past combat experiences, that
there is "[no] guarantee that a recovered emotionally charged memory
accurately reflects a psychologically traumatic incident.' 209
Studies have shown that false memories can be implanted and then
"recalled" at a later time. In one well-known research project, referred to as the
"Mall study," Dr. Elizabeth Loftus first arranged to persuade several persons
that at some time in their past they were lost in a mall, having become separated
from a parent. In subsequent interviews involving a variety of true events and
true memories, twenty-five percent of the subjects recalled as if true the implanted
story about being lost in a mall, often embellishing the basic false facts with
additional surrounding circumstances and emotional material, all of it
unconsciously invented and illusory.210
In another study, college students were given misleading information about
events in their childhood, as well as told true incidents. In two such
experiments, 20 percent and 25.5 percent of the students, respectively, provided
false recalls with varying degrees of specificity and elaboration. 211 While
certain aspects of the study may not be indicative of the likelihood that false
memories of CSA would be recovered in therapy, other aspects make the
conclusion of false memories of CSA even more probable:
First, the social demands of therapy have several powerful features.
The therapist plays and may accentuate the authority role-authority and
expertise influence the acceptance of misinformation. The demands to
remember could be more intense in a therapy situation if the therapist presents
remembering as crucial for healing....
Many adults ... have memories and knowledge that may provide a
basis for the construction of a false recall. For example, many adults were
physically punished as children, most were kissed and held (perhaps when they
did not want to be), all were bathed, and all were seen in the nude by adults.
Thus the personal history of any individual may contain the necessary
building blocks for false recall of abuse .... [also] most adults have heard
stories of abuse that could then serve as building blocks....
209L.C. Kolb, Recovery of Memory and Repressed Fantasy in Combat-Induced
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder of Vietnam Veterans, in HYPNOSIS AND MEMORY 265, 273
(H.M. Pettinati ed., 1988).
210Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Reality of Illusory Memories, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How
MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCr THE PAST (Daniel Schacter et al. eds., 1996);
see also Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Possible Role of Source Misattribution in the Creation of
False Beliefs Among Preschoolers, 42 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 304-20
(1994).
211I.E. Hyman, Jr. et al., False Memories of Childhood Experiences, 9 APPLIED COGNrrIvE
PSYCHOL. 181 (1995).
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Searching for ... memories [of CSA] by repeated questioning, by
providing cues ... or by discouraging doubt may result in the creation
of a false recall.21
2
Professional associations have raised questions about practices and
conclusions of recovered memory therapists: The American Medical
Association has concluded that "recovered memories of childhood sexual
abuse [are] of uncertain authenticity .... [and] should be subject to external
verification. The use of recovered memories is fraught with problems of
potential misapplication."213 The American Psychiatric Association concluded
that "[sicientific knowledge is not yet prescient enough to predict how a certain
experience or factor will influence a memory in a given person."2 14 It further
advised that "clinicians should not exert pressure on patients to believe in events that
may not have occurred."2 15
Regarding the suggestive power of certain techniques, the psychiatrist's
group warned that "memories... can be significantly influenced by a trusted
person (e.g., therapist . . .) who suggests abuse as an explanation for
symptoms/problems, despite initial lack of memory of such abuse.' 216
The American Psychological Association's interim report on the subject,
composed by a panel represented by opposing sides in the controversy,
expressed guarded concerns about the practices of recovered memory therapy,
noting that "it is possible to construct convincing pseudomemories for events
that never occurred."217
The literature, the interviews, and the practices prevailing among recovered
memory incest survivor therapists strongly suggest that the recovered memory
movement is, in not insignificant part, agenda driven. That the agenda involves
a passionate concern regarding a major social evil does not justify its
incongruent intrusion into therapeutic professionalism, an intrusion
2121d. at 194-195. The distinguished child psychologist, Piaget, erroneously
remembered an attempted kidnapping in his very early childhood. Years later he
discovered that the story was fabricated by his nanny. Loftus, supra note 2, at 529.
2 1 3 AMECiAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS:
MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE 8 (1994).
2 14 AMERICA N PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON MEMORIES OF SEXUAL ABUSE 2
(1993).
2151d.
2161d.
2 1 7 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, INTERIM REPORT, WORKING GROUP ON
INVESTIGATION OF MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE 2 (1994).
The ambivalent tone in the preliminary report of the American Psychological
Association's Report seems to reflect intense existing divisiveness among the therapists
(indeed it has been likened to religious warfare), and may also be the product of concern
that strong standards would themselves become a basis for legal liability. For the view
that professional standards should not be crystallized into law, see Robert F. Schoop &
David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care: Psychotherapists and
Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYcHIATRY & L. 163 (1989).
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manifested by a powerful diagnostic bias indifferent to the creation of
imaginary nightmarish biographies.
Psychologist Carol Tavris views the sexual abuse explanation for a variety
of emotional difficulties as a very powerful idea for women generally:
[I]t is a brilliant metaphor for the abuse that many women... feel they
have experienced in society-for their powerlessness, for their
vulnerability, for things that have happened to them over their lives
that they could not explain, but that occurred to them because they are
women living today in modem America. It's a lightening rod for all
the unarticulated frustrations and pains that many women still
suffer.
218
The compassionate and professional treatment of actual victims of traumatic
childhood abuse is unquestionably of compelling importance. It is a tragedy
however, that creation of imagined victims may have brought a backlash that
washes over many actual survivors. But such seem the wages of crying wolf.
VII. THE BOWMAN & MERTZ/ (HARVARD LAW REvIEw) THEsis
Professors Cynthia Grant Bowman and Elizabeth Mertz, in a recent Harvard
Law Review article,219 advocate that the law reject any claimed right of a falsely
accused person to sue a therapist. They contend that permitting such a suit
would be more destructive of social values, good therapy, and the vital interests
of victims of abuse than socially beneficial, even in terms of vindicating falsely
accused persons.
Arguing that an accused's legal action against a therapist would most
probably constitute an unwarranted intervention into a valuable therapeutic
relationship involving a CSA survivor, the article postulates that either a
memory is: a) true, with or without intervention of a therapist; b) false but not
caused by a therapist; or c) false as a result. of egregious conduct by a
therapist.22 0 Because, it declares, which of these situations are in fact the case
cannot be known, a lawsuit cannot be justified.
The position taken herein, however, is that a lawsuit is justified where the
therapist engages in egregiously suggestive practices in treating a patient
presenting with no memories of CSA. 221 Under the statute proposed below,
plaintiff must show that the accusation proximately caused the ultimate
harms.222
218Frontline: Divided Memories (A PBS television broadcast, Apr. 4, 1995).
219 Bowman & Mertz, supra note 7.
2201d. at 582-83.
221 Bowman and Mertz agree that "heavyhanded suggestive techniques whether in
investigative or therapeutic interviews, are generally problematic and are to be avoided
when possible." Id. at 613.
222 See infra PROPOSED STATUTE, Part Xi11 & COMMENTARY ON PROPOSED STATUTE, Part
XIV.
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The strong and understandable concern of Bowman and Mertz is that an
actual child molester might sue a therapist, thereby victimizing and
revictimizing an incest survivor, reasserting domination of her, and
infantilizing her by denying her autonomy.
Reflecting these concerns, the proposed statutory remedy has several
pre-trial and pre-discovery screening devices, a heavy substantive burden on
the plaintiff, and the penalties of disciplinary recommendations and
imposition of attorney fees for frivolous law suits.
In an extensive review of the law, Bowman and Mertz make a plausible
argument that existing legal doctrine does not precisely and literally embrace a
suit interfering with therapy at the instance of a third party, although there are
circumstances, shown herein where courts have done just that.223
It should be noted that before Tarasoff the law did not embrace that type of
suit either; a lawsuit here would require demonstration of a far greater degree
of culpable incompetence than Tarasoff requires.
In any event, the law moves in response to new threats to important values.
Few if any practices of therapists involve such gross departures from
professional obligations as the use of powerful persuaders substantially risking
creation of false memories and false accusations against an innocent person of
sexual atrocities against a child. Few practices are so undeserving of the law's
protection.
Bowman and Mertz recognize the psychotherapeutic enterprise to be fragile,
nuanced, special and deservant of considerable protection from external
intrusions. This is undoubtedly an appropriate view in most situations. Yet just
a few years ago there were similar predominant views about the family itself.
The notion was that family privacy should never be breached and that what
went on within the walls of the home was no outsider's business. Since then,
terrible abuses taking place within the confines of the family have been
repeatedly revealed, leading to the conclusion that breaching the walls of
family privacy may sometimes be necessary.
So with therapy. It is very special, true. But it is not sacred. Terrible abuses
can occur within the therapist's office, such as sexual exploitation of patients
by unscrupulous therapists using the imbalance of authority, transference and
the vulnerability of the patient to gain physical intimacy.
Indeed as psychology professor Margaret A. Hagen of Boston University
suggested, Professor Bowman seems more concerned about disrupting "the
patient's relationship with the therapist, however injurious it may be," than
with preserving the patient's relationships with her family 22 4
223See, e.g., Bowman & Mertz, supra note 7.
224Margaret A. Hagen, Psychotherapists Must be Judged, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1997, at 20.
She concludes that: "[tiherapists, like the rest of the members of society, must be held
accountable when their actions hurt other people. In our modem society, there is no
more effective check on irresponsible behavior by psychotherapists than the third-party
malpractice suit." Id.
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Merely labeling a co-operative enterprise as "therapy," thereby invoking
claims of specialness and virtually absolute confidentiality,225 cannot justify
legal indifference to what happens in such a relationship. The walls of a
therapist's office may no more be used to hatch out, with legal impunity,
unjustified accusations of vile crimes against innocent parties than the walls of
the home may be deemed legally impenetrable. Indeed, by continuing to use
the word "therapy," a malignant process of instilling illusions of terrible sexual
victimization is presumed to be part of a benign and health restoring process.
Throughout most of their article, in ostensibly balancing the equities, in
looking at the costs and benefits of a suit by the accused perpetrator, Professors
2251n a recent decision, the Supreme Court construed the Federal Rules of Evidence
as embodying a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923
(1996). In so doing it explicitly declined to define the scope of the privilege:
A rule that authorizes the recognition of new privileges on a case-by-case
basis makes it appropriate to define the details of new privileges in a like
manner. Because this is the first case in which this Court has recognized
a psychotherapist privilege, it is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate
its full contours in a way that would govern all conceivablefilture questions
[in this area].
Id. at 1932 and 1935.
While the Court rejected what it called a 'balancing component of the privilege,"
it also declared that:
[a]lthough it would be premature to speculate about most future
developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not
doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way,
for example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can
be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.
Id. at 1932 n.19.
The quoted statements, and others, raise significant ambiguities. For example, if
the Court meant to be supportive of the Tarasoff doctrine, as seems to be the case, the
question arises as to the discoverability of therapist-patient communications in a suit
by a survivor of a patient's homicidal victim. If the reference to the Tarasoff situation
meant to permit, if not endorse, the application of the Tarasoffdoctrine, then, is the Court
engaged in 'balancing?" On the other hand, the quoted statement may mean only that
a therapist is immune from liability to a patient for taking action to prevent harmful acts
by the patient.
By leaving open the scope of the privilege, while approving of disclosures to
prevent harm, the Court has left undecided whether other vital concerns might be placed
outside the privilege, particularly vital social concerns that transcend the interests of a
particular litigant. The phenomena of false accusations following highly suggestive
practices is one that has become a matter of serious social concern beyond the interests
of particular litigants.
Moreover, in rejecting a balancing component, the example the Court gave
involved weighing the importance of a therapeutic communication of the outcome of
particular litigation. In so doing, it did not reject consideration of the magnitude of the
evil asserted by a plaintiff. Suppose, for example, that a patient, instigated by an actually
malevolent therapist, "got even" with her father by phoning him and falsely claiming
that her sister had just been killed in an automobile accident?
In any event, if the statute recommended herein is enacted, then whatever arguable
obstacles may exist under privilege doctrines in a jurisdiction adopting it, will be
superseded by the statutory provisions.
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Bowman and Mertz assume that the patient has in fact been sexually abused by
the plaintiff. Throughout, they regard the patient as an incest victim. Of course,
where such is actually the case, then their arguments are obviously compelling.
But if one commences analysis without presuming knowledge of the outcome of
litigation, then the situation becomes one of probabilities and fairness.
An irrebutable presumption that patients have actually been sexually
victimized in childhood would seem to allow nine innocent people and their
families to suffer the impact of false accusations of unspeakable crimes, in order
that one actual victim not have her therapy aborted by an actual molester.
Notwithstanding this author's differences with some of the critical premises
and arguments, some of their expressed concerns are not without force and
have been taken into account in the legislative solution recommended below.
VIII. UNDUE SUGGESTIVENESS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW
The law itself recognizes the capacity of suggestiveness to produce invalid
or undesirable results. It is hardly necessary to bring science, psychology, or
theory to bear in support of the proposition that suggestive practices can induce
a person to provide a response desired by the other. For example, the
prohibition of leading questions on direct examination assumes that they
would direct the witness to a response desired by the questioner.
Even more to the point, in order to prevent erroneous identifications and
false convictions, the law forbids the use of identification techniques before
trial (e.g., line-ups) that are so unduly suggestive as to be highly conducive to
irreparable misidentification.2 26
Paralleling Supreme Court observations regarding witnesses at a lineup
(conducted outside the presence of defense counsel), a therapy patient is not
likely to be "alert for," or "schooled in the detection of, suggestive influences 227
in the service of a biased therapist's crime-busting agenda.
Under the doctrine of entrapment, the law recognizes that there are
circumstances where the idea of criminality may not be fairly ascribed to a
defendant-i.e., where the idea of the crime originated in the mind of the law
enforcement officer, who implanted it in the mind of the defendant 228 or where
the idea for the crime was the product of "creative activity" of law
enforcement. 229 The defendant is said to have been induced, enticed, or
persuaded into committing the offense.230
226 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
227
"[N]either witnesses nor lineup participants are apt to be alert for conditions
prejudicial to the suspect. And, if they were, it would likely be of scant benefit to the
suspect since neither witnesses nor lineup participants are likely to be schooled in the
detection of suggestive influences." United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 331 (1973).
228Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
2291d.
230Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
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In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government agents may not
originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind the
disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of
the crime so that the Governmentmay prosecute.
231
Under certain circumstances such crime inducing behavior mandates an
acquittal.
Moreover, were a therapist culpably to convince a patient that she was
molested by her father, and further convince her to give testimony to that effect,
the therapist might be guilty of committing the actus reus of soliciting or
suborning perjury (although the required mens rea would probably be absent).
The literature of false confessions reveals that not all are the product of raw
coercion. Some are the result of strong suggestion or techniques of persuasion
used with vulnerable suspects.
Under certain circumstances, techniques that merely tend to elicit
confessions or admissions are forbidden. 232 These include highly suggestive
statements made in the presence of vulnerable suspects.233
Finally, if some recovered memory therapists were attorneys, they might be
subject to discipline for coaching a witness. Such therapists are effectively
putting testimony in the mind of a complaining witness (in patient's suits
against alleged molesters).
In sum, the law disfavors putting dangerous falsehoods in people's heads,
at least those falsehoods which directly induce prohibited or actionable
anti-social behavior.
IX. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL DocTRINE
Does current legal doctrine support a cause of action by a plaintiff falsely
accused of CSA against a therapist for inducing or implanting false memories
of such abuse in the mind of the adult patient? Here, the caselaw will be
examined.
A. Physicians' Duties to Third Parties
1. Tarasoff
In this part of the discussion of legal doctrine it is assumed that, as related
above, the harm from false accusations of CSA is sufficiently severe and
palpable as to be judicially cognizable.
In the landmark case of Tarasoff 11,234 the California Supreme Court held that
where a therapist has concluded, or "under applicable professional standards
2311d. at 548.
232 For example, where Miranda rights have not been waived. See Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
233 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
234551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) [hereinafter Tarasoff].
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reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of
violence to others, she bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger."235 Such required protection might include
warning potential victims or others of the danger.
This doctrine overrides any claimed sanctity of the therapist-patient
relationship and traditional notions requiring privity for standing to sue,
recognizing that a therapist has legal duties to third parties. Those who may
be harmed (physically, in the Tarasoff scenario) by predictable acts of a patient,
have a legally enforceable right to protection against injury caused by the
negligence of a psychotherapist.
Of the many jurisdictions that have adopted the Tarasoff doctrine or a close
variant thereof, some require, for therapist liability, that the reasonably
foreseeable victim be "identifiable."23 6 In such jurisdictions, there tends to be a
requirement that the patient have threatened harm to an identifiable victim.237 In
some jurisdictions there is a duty on the part of a psychiatrist who should have
reasonably foreseen danger from a patient to take steps to control the patient (such
as by instituting commitment proceedings), whether or not the patient
threatened harm.238 Some jurisdictions hold that where the psychiatrist fails to
control the patient, the psychiatrist is liable to all who fall within the zone of
danger.239
Tarasoff has been criticized for 1) its assumption that dangerous behavior is
foreseeable, and for 2) its requirement, explicit or implicit, that a therapist act
against the patient's therapeutic interest and 3) in violation of confidentiality.
The first two criticisms do not apply in the falsely-accused plaintiff scenario
because: 1) the harm is unquestionably foreseeable; and 2) there is substantial
doubt whether the therapist is acting in the patient's best interest in inducing
false memories and illusory beliefs of sexual victimization.
235 1d. at 345.
236Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 732-38 (Cal. 1980).
23 71d. In Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983), affd, 751 F.2d 329
(10th Cir. 1984) the court held that absent a threat to an identifiable victim, a dangerous
act was not foreseeable. Id.
23 8Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
497 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (D.C. Neb. 1980).
239 See generally Robert F. Schopp, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect the Public: The
Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory and Empirical Premises, 70 NEB. L.
REv. 327, 328 (1991).
"A person falls within the zone of danger if they [sic] are foreseeably endangered
by the defendant's conduct or if they [sic] are a member of a category of persons
foreseeably endangered." Id. at 330. (summarizing Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775
P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989).
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Regarding confidentiality in Tarasoff, it is breached by compliance with the
primary obligation (warning a potential victim of a patient's dangerousness or
testifying against a patient in a civil commitment hearing).240 Under a legal
doctrine forbidding the implanting of a false memory, there would be no breach
of confidence in complying with the primary legal obligation (to treat a patient
with open-mindedness, integrity, and respect for the truth); there would,
however, be a sacrifice of confidentiality where a lawsuit went forward
charging violation of the obligation not to recklessly induce false memories. 241
Indeed, a Tarasoff warning or involuntary commitment may be
counter-therapeutic as well as violative of patient confidentiality. Complying
with the requirements of therapy, implicit in the cause of action recommended
here, would avoid a probably counter-therapeutic result (persuading and
treating a non-abused patient as an historical victim of childhood sexual
molestation). Misdiagnosing a patient as a victim of CSA or implanting a false
memory of CSA could hardly be considered therapeutic.
(The closest analogy to Tarasoff is not here recommended as appropriate to
extend to the Ramona-type claim-i.e., to hold that either where a patient
reaches a false conclusion of CSA without significant influence by the therapist,
or where the therapist negligently fails to diagnose the falsity of the plaintiff's
self-generated false memory, that the therapist has a duty to either disabuse the
patient of the erroneous belief, or to prevent the making of the accusation.)
Unlike Tarasoff, the false accusation action does not depend on finding a duty
to act affirmatively to avoid foreseeable harm, based on a special relationship
(although a special relationship is often manifest in these scenarios). A
Ramona-type lawsuit involves positive acts by the defendant-therapist
generating the harm to the plaintiff. The duty to the falsely accused plaintiff is
to avoid grossly irresponsible behaviors that would turn a patient into a
powerful psychic weapon-destroying reputation and family, and imposing
emotional anguish.
Consider other situations where a physician might by act rather than omission,
render a patient more dangerous: e.g., prescribing drugs without a
concomitant warning against driving, terminating lithium treatment (or
prescribing CNS stimulants) regarding a manic patient with a history of
240
"We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confidential
character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which
disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the
public peril begins." Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347. John M. Adler, Relying Upon the
Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law
Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 867, 890, n.7 (1991); Vanessa
Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for
Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263,294 (1982); cf. Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond
Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation To Breach Confidentiality, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 495
(1990) (AIDS).
241The statute recommended herein would require an in camera examination of
otherwise confidential materials. For an analogous procedure regarding a Tarasoffsuit
see Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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dangerous behavior; and culpably and actively exposing a third person to an
infectious disease (e.g., by assuring such person of the absence of danger of
contagion).242
The discussion will return, of course, to an obviously major distinction
between a Tarasoff suit and the proposed suit-i.e., under Tarasoff, the law is
dealing with a homicidal or physically assaultive act, while different sorts of
harm are implicated here.
2. Communicable Diseases
It would advance the literature very little to rehearse the case law on the duty
of a physician (or hospital) to warn family members that the patient is suffering
from a contagious disease. While such a doctrine is by no means universal,
several cases so hold.243 Earlier cases held that a physician may not mislead a
family member or others into believing a person is free of contagion. 244
Warning others that a patient has a contagious disease does not create
liability for breach of physician-patient confidentiality.245 In 1958, in Berry v.
Moench, the Utah Supreme Court held that a physician's duty to preserve the
confidentiality of patient information is subject to a conditional privilege to
disclose what is reasonably necessary to protect a sufficiently important
242See, e.g., Jones v. Stanko, infra note 244. Cf. the Dram Shop and the "social host"
Doctrines. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 43, para. 135 (1961); N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW
§ 11.1101 (McKinney 1978); OI-no REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1985).
243Shepard v. Redford Community Hosp., 390 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(hospital had duty to disclose infectious condition of patient to members of family);
Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984)(dicta)(physician may be
liable for failure to warn those exposed to patient of patient's infectious illness but not
liable to unforeseeable baby-sitter).
Notwithstanding the precedent for requiring a warning to those who might
contract a disease from a patient, recent consideration of similar issues regarding AIDS
patients have led several state legislatures to prohibit disclosure of the medical condition
of such patients, even to actual or potential sexual partners. Such legislation is
apparently motivated by a strong and justifiable concern regarding the privacy of AIDS
patients, and confidentiality of their condition, particularly in view of the
fear-engendering, severely stigmatic and ostracism-producing consequences of
disclosure.
244Edwards v. Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899)(physician liable to plaintiff's wife for
negligently assuring her it was safe to care for patient's wounds); Skillings v. Allen, 173
N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919)(physician liable to patient's parents for assuring safety to
them of visit to patient and of taking child home, where child had scarlet fever); Davis
v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921)(facts closely analogous to Skillings); Jonesv. Stanko,
160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928)(physician liable to care-giving neighbor for assuring him that
patient's condition was not contagious (where patient had smallpox); Wojcik v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. 1959). Indeed one case held that a
physician had a duty to advise a spouse of her husband's cause of death even though
not a contagious disease, so that the survivor could avoid exposure to a common
environmental danger. Williams v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993).
245Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920).
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interest. 246 The court explained: "Where life, safety, well-being or other
important interest is in jeopardy, one having information which could protect
against the hazard, may have a conditional privilege to reveal information for
such purpose. 247
It has also been held that a physician is liable to a third party where the
physician fails to give the patient proper advice about avoiding the spread of
the disease:
Such precautions are taken not to protect the health of the patient,
whose well-being has already been compromised, rather such
precautions are taken to safeguard the health of others .... If a third person
is in that class of persons whose health is likely to be threatened by the patient,
and if erroneous advice is given to that patient to the ultimate detriment of
the third person, the third person has a cause of action against the
physician ....248
A therapist who culpably implants false memories of CSA renders his or her
patient harmful. The patient is carrying a harmful (social) virus; contact with
(accusations toward) highly vulnerable people (the patient's family) operates
to spread and implant the toxin, indeed to spread it in ways harmful far beyond
the harm to the patient. Like a carrier of a very devastaly illness, the patient is
most likely to pass on this pathology, or a paradoxically 'elated pathology, to
members of the family.
3. Other Duties to Third Parties
Plaintiffs who contract a venereal disease, such as genital herpes, from their
spouses have recovered from defendants who transmitted the disease to the
spouses in extramarital sexual relations.249 Has not a therapist caused the toxic
condition in an adult patient who in turn, in personal interaction with the plaintiff
family member and others, transmits the toxic accusation, which ultimately strikes the
plaintiff directly and through the reactions of others?
While it is sometimes said that a person should not be held liable for the acts
of another, absent the traditional justifications for respondeat superior, there are
important exceptions to that rule where vital social interests are at stake. Under
Dram Shop Acts, for example, the defendant who sells alcohol to an intoxicated
person becomes liable for injuries to third parties caused by virtue
246Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814,817 (Utah 1958).
247Id. at 817-18.
248DiMarco v. Lynch Homes, 583 A.2d 422,424 (Pa. 1990).
249Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989) (a person who has a venereal
disease (here, a male) who has sexual relations with a married person (in this case a
wife) but fails to inform that person of his condition, is liable to the third-party spouse
(the husband) who contracted the disease before the infected spouse is aware of her own
infection).
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of the intoxication. 250 Where a therapist effectively induces a false memory of
CSA that the patient had not previously remembered at all, it is similar to
intoxicating or inflaming the patient to act in a manner dangerous and injurious to a
confluence of interests of great social and legally protected value. Like alcohol, some
of the methods of extreme suggestiveness, severely distort mental processes of
the patient, and untenably render the patient a danger to the innocent accused
person and "safety" of the family.
Courts have found physicians liable to third parties physically injured in
vehicle accidents where the defendant failed to warn his patient about the
dangers of driving under prescribed medication;251 and where a doctor,
negligently failing to diagnose epilepsy, advised the patient that he could
drive;252 and where a physician advised a severely distraught, emotionally
overwhelmed patient to drive to the hospital.253
Here again, culpable acts or omissions involving medical matters (rather
than mere failure to control a patient) led to physicians' liability to third parties.
250See, e.g., ILL. REV. STATS. ch. 43, para. 135 (1961); N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 11.1101
(McKinney 1978).
Ohio's Dram Shop Act provides:
A husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person
injured in person, property, or means of support by an intoxicated
person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise,
of a person, after the issuance and during the existence of the order
of the department of liquor control prohibiting the sale of intoxica-
ting liquor as defined in section 4301.01 of the Revised Code to such
person, has a right of action in his own name, severally or jointly,
against any person selling or giving intoxicating liquors which
cause such intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person.
OFno REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1985).
In some jurisdictions where one who sells or socially provides liquor to minors,
and where the intoxicated minor thereafter causes injury to another, the seller is liable
for the injuries suffered by the third party.
For decisions imposing social host liability based upon liquor control statutes
forbidding sale or distribution of alcohol to minors, see, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 309
N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 577
P.2d 669 (Cal. 1978); Walker v. Key, 686 P.2d 973 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) Sutter v.
Hutchings, 327S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1985); Longstrethv. Gensel, 377N.W.2d 804 (Mich. 1985);
Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983): Koback v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d
857 (Wis. 1985).
251 See, e.g., Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Kaiser v. Suburban
Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1965) (cause of action exists against doctor who did not
warn bus driver-patient of drowsiness associated with medication for nasal condition
who then had accident resulting in plaintiff's injury); Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (doctor's failure to diagnose or properly treat epilepsy may
foreseeably create risk of harm to third party).
252Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973); but see Davis v. Mangelsdorf, 673
P.2d 951 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (dismissed for failure to state a cause of action against
physician for advising an epileptic patient to discontinue anticonvulsant seventeen
years before auto accident injuring plaintiff).
253Myers v. Quesenberry, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
(Harm and the general type of harm in these cases was foreseeable, although
particular plaintiffs were not.) These cases find liability to third parties, not on
the basis of failure to warn third parties of an illness, but by virtue of advice
given or not given to the patient. Because of the physician's culpability, the
patient is rendered foreseeably dangerous.
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Suits for infliction of emotional damages have been suspect in the law. Early
in the evolution of tort doctrine, courts rejecting such suits expressed the
concern that claims for emotional damages were too easy to claim, too subtle
to measure, too subject to false or fraudulent claims, too speculative, and
all-told, too burdensome and risky to society. More recently, courts have
allowed recovery under certain conditions.
Recovery for pain and suffering, though subjective,254 has long been
permitted when accompanying physical injury. More recently, claims for
infliction of emotional distress have been upheld where plaintiff suffered
physical harm. Many courts permit recovery where there is physical harm to a
third party, and plaintiff, alleging emotional harm, was in the zone of physical
danger (or in some jurisdictions, a bystander concurrently witnessing physical
harm to a third party).
Given that California, in Ramona, was the first state in which damages were
awarded against a therapist to a family member charged by his daughter with
CSA, a brief look at California law is warranted. Two lines of cases seem to form
the corpus of the relevant California law.
One line of cases begins with Dillon v. Legg,255 in which the California
Supreme Court allowed recovery for emotional distress to a parent who
witnessed a child being killed by the negligent defendant, even though the
parent was not injured or in the zone of danger.256
A second line of cases granted emotional distress damages to persons, other
than a patient, who were found to be a "direct victim" of a physician's
malpractice. In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,257 the patient-wife was
misdiagnosed as having syphilis. At the request of the physician, she informed
her husband of the diagnosis so that he could come in for the necessary blood
254Damages for emotional harm were considered "parasitic," that is, recoverable only
when attached to another tort. William L. Prosser, IntentionalInfliction ofMental Suffering:
A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874,874-79 (1939).
255441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
256From this developed a line of cases determining when bystanders could recover
emotional damages. While subsequent cases were subject to criticism because they
introduced uncertainty into matters of liability, being based simply on the notion of
reasonable foreseeability, the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa, limited,
but did not overrule Dillon, holding that to recover for emotional harm the plaintiff must
be present at the scene and aware that the injury is taking place. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
257616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (en banc).
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tests. Both spouses suffered extreme emotional distress, indeed hostility,
suspicion, anxiety, and eventually, such marital discord that the wife divorced
the husband.
In a suit by the husband against the physician, the court reasoned that the
alleged malpractice was directed at the husband-plaintiff as well as the wife,
and that therefore the husband was the "direct" victim.258 The doctrine of
"direct victim" became an alternative to granting recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to a bystander at the time of the
injury-producing event.
The Molien line of cases included an action awarding damages to parents
where a psychologist misdiagnosed their child as suffering from acute brain
syndrome, the parents being foreseeably harmed, emotionally. 259 Similarly,
parents recovered where a defendant-physician failed to make a prenatal
diagnosis of Down's Syndrome, the father being a reasonably foreseeable
victim by virtue of his participation in "the reproductive life of the marital
couple."260
California may be retreating from the Molien doctrine, in the sense of
distinguishing it from recent fact patterns where "direct harm" is arguable. 261
However, in distinguishing one of the cases, the court described Molien as
permitting the non-patient husband to recover because the doctor assumed "a
direct duty toward the husband; [i.e.,] the doctor directed his patient, the wife, to advise
the plaintiff-husband of the diagnosis." Contrary to arguments made by Bowman
and Mertz, to the effect that Molien is no longer precedent for recovery byfalsely
accused relatives, 262 even the italicized narrow description of the Molien
holding would support recovery against a therapist who encouraged a patient
to confront a relative with accusations. In both situations, the negligent therapist
has caused the patient to involve a third party in a way that caused psychic anguish to
that party.
Admittedly, however, Molien went further in permitting damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress than the considerable majority of
other jurisdictions.
258Id.
259 See Accounts Adjustment Bureau v. Copperman, 204 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984).
260 Newton v. Kaiser Hosp., 228 Cal. Rptr. 890, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (recovery was
based on prenatal malpractice and permitted to both parents).
261In Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., the mother of a minor child
had standing to sue a psychotherapist who sexually molested the child-patient, for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) (en banc). As later
interpreted, however, the mother's recovery was explained by the fact that the therapist
was treating both her and the child. Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
See also Huggins v. Longs Drg Stores Cal., Inc., where parents who suffered emotional
distress were denied recovery against a pharmacist who negligently prescribed a toxic
dose of medication that they gave to their child. 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).
262 Bowman & Mertz, supra note 7, at 569-74.
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As will be argued below: a) what is apparently left standing of the Molien
doctrine would support the action contemplated herein; and b) such an action
would be supported by other doctrines and by the jurisprudential concept of
"duty" properly understood and applied.
Most courts will not allow recovery for emotional harm simply on proof that
the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable emotional victim of negligence, although
there are some jurisdictions that do permit such recovery,263 particularly where
the claim has some intrinsic "guarantee of genuineness."264 When one is
accused of a heinous crime against a child, the genuineness of an emotional
distress claim cannot be doubted.
Given the strong causal links between the implanting offalse memories, the making
of accusations, and the inevitability of a multiplicity of emotional harms, the policies
otherwise limiting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional harm (to guarantee
genuineness and to prevent recovery based on false claims or speculative injuries) are
inapplicable to an action by an accused father. Nevertheless as shall be argued
below, mere negligence, even if it could suffice in an action claiming emotional harm,
should not be sufficient to hold a psychotherapist liable, given the desirability of degrees
offreedom in the therapist-patient relationship.265 Moreover to intrude on the right
to confidentiality in the psychotherapist relationship, a showing of more
aggravated egregiousness than mere negligence should be required. The next
question is whether the law supports an action for intentional or reckless
infliction of emotional harm.
C. Reckless Infliction/Fort Of Outrage
Courts have been more willing to allow recovery of damages for infliction
of emotional distress where the defendant has "intentionally, recklessly and/or
outrageously" (rather than merely "negligently") caused severe emotional
harm. Liability attaches only if the actor: "by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another."
266
2 63 See W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., ON THE LAWOF TORTS 364-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]. Also, in cases involving disease phobia, courts permit recovery
where the patient has been actually exposed to the feared disease. See K.A.C. v. Benson,
527 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. 1995).
264 See, e.g., Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, reh'g denied, 154 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y.
1958)(patient developed cancerphobia after a physician told her that she might contract
cancer from a radiation bum). Cf. Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995)(no
cause of action stated where patient alleged emotional distress from misdiagnosis of
HIV positivity).
265 The requirement of outrageousness and recklessness has also been suggested in
Yamini, supra note 7.
266REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see, e.g., Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P.2d 1024,
1029 (Kan. 1991).
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The requirement of outrageousness is said to substantially alleviate concerns
that the claim of emotional distress is either false or insufficiently palpable
267
to permit non-speculative or arbitrary damage awards. The accusation
generates "emotional distress.., of such extreme degree the law must intervene
because the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person should be
expected to endure it."268 Given such a proof requirement, it is unlikely that
recognizing the Ramona-type tort would open the floodgates to innumerable
claims.
It is submitted that hypersuggestive practices by therapists committed to
discovering childhood sexual molestation abundantly satisfy the test of
outrageousness:
The prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of decent men
and women in a civilized community is considered outrageous and
intolerable. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts
to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor and lead him to exclaim "Outrageous!
269
False or fraudulent claims of emotional distress are not an issue when'
emotional stress inevitably accompanies being accused of a criminal and
morally outrageous crime against a child.
There is an apparent requirement, however, under the outrageous infliction
of emotional distress doctrine that the plaintiff be present at the time of the
outrageous conduct.270 The rationales of the presence requirement are
inappropriate in the aggravated Ramona-type case. Imposition of such a
requirement is unnecessary to assure that the defendant foresees the imposition
of such suffering; to guarantee that the suffering is genuine and severe; to avoid
unlimited liability to unforeseeable plaintiffs; or to assure that an undue burden
is not placed on a defendant.
That such a cause of action is valid absent plaintiff's presence has been
recognized. A federal district court held that a cause of action for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress predicated on "extreme and
outrageous" conduct would not be dismissed where plaintiff-family members (who
were not present) claimed that the therapist-defendant "falsely convinced" the
patient (a twenty-eight year-old daughter), by highly unreliable methods, that
the father had sexually abused her as a child. 271
2671n terms of the assessment or valuation of damages, the law has come to appreciate
that "emotional trauma, is no more difficult to value than physical pain." John W.
McNamara, Note, Murder And The Tort OfInten tional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, 1986
DUKE L.J. 572, 574 (1986).
2681d.; Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P. 2d at 1025.
2 6 9 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, cmt. 9 (1948 & Supp.).
270RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (2)(a), (2)(b) (1965).
27 1Lindgren v. Moore, 907 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-90 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See also supra cases
discussed in test accompanying notes 66, 67 and 73.
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Moreover, the Restatement seems to contemplate situations in which a
presence requirement might be inappropriate. A Caveat to Section 46 (2)
provides: "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be
other circumstances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.' 272
A recent decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the Caveat.273
There, the husband and minor child of a woman who committed suicide sued
the wife-mother's stepfather for causing her to take her life. Although the
plaintiffs were not present during the defendant's acts, and did not witness the
act of suicide, the court found that they "were present in the immediate aftermath
of the tragic results of Appellee's outrageous conduct, and the suicide was the final
result of a continuing course of conduct instigated by Appellee. "274
Finally, in a meaningful sense, a person falsely accused of CSA as a result of
memories recklessly implanted is an immediate and direct victim of the therapist's
wrongdoing. In other words, the plaintiff's claim is not (simply) derivative; it is not
derived through a claim of a primary wrong done to someone else. (Although
a wrong has been done to the patient, the patient, being unaware of her present
victimization, has not objected.) Indeed while malpractice is involved, the
plaintiff's claim is not simply an extension of malpractice liability, but a malfeasance
toward the plaintiff.
Treating the patient as a conduit here does not deny that she has free will. It
does, however, recognize the considerable vulnerability of many patients to
the powers of the therapist.275 Although the patient may still have free will, her
capacity to resist powerful suggestions of a therapist may be very much
compromised. In such a situation, the accused person may be deemed
constructively present when the outrageous conduct is executed. Moreover,
where the therapist actually counsels some form of confrontation by the adult
patient with the accused molester, the accused is directly targeted to suffer
severe mental anguish.
D. Defamation
In a Texas case, parents of a patient successfully sued a therapist for slander
where they had met with the therapist who repeated allegations of sexual abuse
2 7 2 REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46(2)(a), (2)(b) (1965).
273R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994).
274Id. at 33-34.
275 Law and ethics recognize the great vulnerability of psychotherapist patients. For
example, a psychiatrist is forbidden, by the ethics of the American Psychiatric
Association, to ever have sexual relations with a person who was once a patient. The
American Psychological Association forbids sexual relations with a patient within two
years after termination of therapy.
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to the husband and four daughters of the patient. The daughter, having
retracted her claims of abuse, testified at the trial.276
The law of defamation compensates for statements or acts that tend to injure
a person in his reputation or profession or humiliate, shame, or degrade a
person in the eyes of others. An actionable statement is one that tends to expose
a plaintiff to ridicule, hatred, and contempt, "or cause him to be shunned or
avoided.' 277 A false accusation of an infamous or disgraceful crime is slander
per se (actionable even without proof of actual harm).278
Where a seventeen-year-old baby sitter was falsely accused of molesting the
child (the defendant-parents distributed flyers throughout the neighborhood
referring to him as a "sex offender"), the court, in upholding the babysitter's
lawsuit, 279 observed that "[tihere are few accusations more damaging or
harmful to a young man's reputation than being called a sex offender or child
molester. "280 The false accusations reflect on his "integrity, character and good
name and tended to expose him to public hatred, contempt and disgrace."281
The "publication" requirement, as a condition to liability for defamation,
means proof that the defendant made the defamatory statement to at least one
person exclusive of the person defamed. 282 Actionable "publication" includes
communication of the defamatory statement to a member of the plaintiff's
family.283 Making the accusation by innuendo will suffice;284 and even though
the plaintiff not be named, if the recipient of the communication would
reasonably understand that the statement refers to the plaintiff, then the
defamatory statement will be treated as "of and concerning" the plaintiff.285
If the patient publishes (disseminates) the statement to someone other than,
or in addition to, the accused, the therapist would be liable for republication
276See Thorn Weidlich, 'False' Memory, Big Award, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9, 1995, at A6; Steve
Blow, Slander Case Shakes Family, Psychiatrist, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11, 1995, at
25A; Nancy E. Roman, Doctor Guilty of Slander in Bogus-Sex-Abuse Case, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1994, at Al.
2 77 PROSSER & KEETON, suipra note 263, at 773.
278 1d. at 788-89.
279 Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. 1996).
2801d. at 400.
28 11d.
2 8 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at 577 states: "Publication of defamatory matter
is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person
defamed." The making of the accusation to the father is not, in and of itself, a publication
of the libel or slander, but for reasons explored and to be explored, is an outrageously
reckless infliction of emotional anguish.
283PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 263, at 798.
284 Id. at 780-83.
285 d. at 783.
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where the patient's publication is "reasonably foreseeable '286 or "a natural and
probable consequence of the originator's actions."287 In most cases the therapist
would either intend repetition or reasonably expect the patient to repeat the
accusation.
The therapist might be considered the originator of the defamation if s/he
used unduly suggestive words or gestures that communicated to the patient
the belief, or created in the patient the false memory, reflecting the defamatory
charge, either explicitly, indirectly, or by innuendo, that plaintiff sexually
molested the patient in her childhood.
To maintain and reinforce one's investment in the newly discovered
"memory" of CSA, the patient might well broadcast the accusation to friends,
co-workers, and relatives, even prior to making the accusation to the one
accused.288  /
Arguably, there is or should be a qualified privilege on the part of the
therapist to communicate to his patient his conclusions regarding the patient's
history, or deeper causes of the patient's emotional maladies. The relationship
between therapist and patient is one that society especially values and protects.
Indeed, communications within this relationship are ordinarily privileged
from disclosure absent strong countervailing interests. Because therapists
usually perform a valuable social service, communications should be protected
from a defamation action unless they manifest a conscious indifference and
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.289 However, "no reasons of policy
can be found for conferring immunity upon the foolish and reckless defamer
who blasts an innocent reputation without making any attempt to verify his
statements."2
90
Once the defendant establishes that the statements or innuendoes he
communicated to the patient are in the context of a qualified privilege, sound
interpretation of existing doctrine requires plaintiff to prove that defendant
acted recklessly in reaching his conclusion as to the truth or falsity of the
defamatory communication.
It is submitted, that given proof in any suit by a plaintiff asserting a false
accusation, that a therapist employed hypersuggestive techniques with a
2 8 6 See Brown v. First Nat'l Bank of Mason City, 193 N.W.2d 547 (Iowa 1972).
287See, e.g., Davis v. National Broadcasting Co., 320 F. Supp. 1070,1072 (E.D. La. 1970),
affd, 447 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1971); McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980); see generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.13[211
(1986).
28 8See OFsHE & WAITERs, supra note 15, at 98.
28 9See Dun & Bradstreet v. Robinson, 345 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. 1961).
29 0PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 263, at 835.
The authors go on to say: "the best statement of the rule is that the defendant is required
to act as a reasonable person under the circumstances, with due regard to the strength
of his belief, the grounds that he has to support it, and the importance of conveying the
information." Id. at 835.
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patient who presented with no memory of sexual abuse, such as to create a
significant probability of eliciting false memories or beliefs of CSA, a
requirement of reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a direct or indirect
slander would be met.
E. Other Arguably Relevant Doctrines
1. Informed Consent
Before a physician may use either an experimental technique or a technique
that embodies a material risk of an undesirable result, s/he must advise the
patient of the material risk and obtain from that patient his or her informed
consent to undertake the procedure. Damages awarded in some suits against
therapists were based on the failure to obtain informed consent from the
patient. (E.g., where the patient was the plaintiff. In at least one suit brought by
an accused family member, the informed consent doctrine was the basis of
recovery.) It would not at all be viable to require a therapist to obtain the
informed consent of all who might eventually be accused, and, indeed, any
such requirement would unjustifiably burden a therapeutic relationship before
any harm to a third party resulted. Nevertheless, the therapist's failure to obtain
informed consent from the patient for unduly risky or experimental procedures
would be relevant to establishing gross negligence or recklessness, assuming
other doctrines enabled a suit by an accused plaintiff.
Indiana has recently become the first state to enact an informed consent
requirement specifically addressed to mental health professionals. Signed into
law on April 17, 1997, at Indiana Code § 16-36-1.5-10, it provides:
"A mental health provider shall inform each patient of the mental
health provider about:
1) the mental health provider's training and credentials;
2) the reasonably foreseeable risks and relative benefits of proposed
treatments and altemative treatments; and
3) the patient's right to withdraw consent for treatment at any time."
2. Harm to Family
Damages to filial relations are compensable in few jurisdictions. The Illinois
cases considered earlier were in the context of that jurisdiction's recognition of
a cause of action for destruction of family ties. In most jurisdictions, damages
for loss of consortium, the analogous harm, are recoverable only where there
has been tortious physical injury or wrongful death inflicted on a close family
member.29 1 Moreover, most states have abolished suits for alienation of
affections.
29 1Regarding a jurisdiction disallowing recovery for destroying filial relations, an
interesting issue is whether in assessing emotional distress, a jury may consider the
distress resulting from destruction of family ties.
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Here, however, there is a form of seduction by one having far greater
psychological power and authority, followed by an accusation against a
member of the family. The accuser's break from the family (if she had not
broken before therapy) would not wholly describe the extent or severity of the
harm. For the family beyond the wrongly accused member will also suffer
profound suspiciousness, severance of ties, emotional disturbances,
overwhelming grief, anxiety, humiliation, embarrassment, and social stigma.
Over and over from the relevant literature on this subject cry the words "it was
like tearing my heart out."
The massive destructive impact on families goes far beyond the
consequences of alienation of affections. Given that such damages are not
speculative or readily subject to fabrication, but embody strong indicia of
genuineness from the nature of the outrageous and the accusatory assault on the
family member or members, it would seem justifiable to permit such damages
where it is otherwise concluded that a suit may be brought. (Alternatively, the
foreseeable infliction of family devastation from the use of hypersuggestive
techniques on a patient with no memory of CSA may itself be part of the
outrageousness substantively justifying a lawsuit.)
An intact family is valued by our legal system and sabotaging its capacity to
function in a healthy way is legally and constitutionally suspect. Of course, if
one assumes that the family was a cover for abuse, then notions of protecting
family values must be subordinated to compelling counter-considerations. If,
however, the question is whether a plaintiff can establish a high probability
that the accusations against him are false and that the therapist abused the
sanctity of the psychological consulting room, then emphasis on the law's
protections of intact families is powerfully pertinent.
In Merkel v. Doe,292 a Court of Common Pleas struck down as
unconstitutional an Ohio statutory provision that would have permitted a
putative father to challenge the parenthood of a child living in an intact family.
The court made the following observations:
[A]s a family, the Does have a constitutionally protected interest in
maintaining the privacy and integrity of their relationship to one
another and to their child. The Supreme Court has consistently
protected the family unit from intrusion .... Our decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.
" 293
292635 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1993).
2931d. at 72 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 490, 494 (1976)). Other
cases cited were, Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(individual right to
decide whether to bear children); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(right to choose
whom to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(married couple's right
to use contraceptives in the privacy of their home); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944)(due process encompasses the family relationship); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)(right to choose child's education).
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Finally, as the Merkel court noted, the Supreme Court has consistently sought
to protect "the sanctity of the unitary family.' 294
Beyond the protection of the family,295 Ohio has recently recognized the right
of a parent to recover damages reflecting a loss of consortium where a child is
physically injured (a requirement considered herein as unnecessary to serve its
ordinary rationales.) The court recognized the nature of the loss a parent suffers
when deprived of the opportunity to interact with his or her child, and
observed that the essence of the relationship and thus the measure of true losses
are the "society, companionship, comfort, love and solace between parent and
child...."296
3. Contract
In Tuman v. Genesis Associates, considered in Part IH(C), the court found that
parents who paid for therapy, relied on promises, and suffered foreseeable
emotional harm as a result of breach of those promises could recover. (The claim
of intentional infliction of emotional harm was also found viable.) This was a
unique holding. To this author it does not seem tenable to rest issues of liability
for generating false accusations of unspeakable crimes on theories of contract.
X. THE CONCEPT OF DuTY
So there are several fairly strong doctrinal supports for the imposition of
legal liability on a psychotherapist who culpably generates false accusations of
odious crimes thereby causing a variety of harms, from emotional anguish to
family devastation and/or to ruin of reputation. While some of the legal
prerequisites for recovery under some of the doctrines are not present in a
Ramona-type action, the essential evils at the core of such doctrines are
implicated and the prerequisites (e.g., presence, physical harm) make little
sense applied to the present circumstances. Surely, the legal emanations from
the core of the doctrines (not merely their peripheral applications or values)
2941d. at 74.
295 Moreover, no position is taken as to whether all damages should be awarded to
the falsely accused person, or whether other psychically-socially injured family
members (of a given degree of proximity to the accused) should also have standing to
sue. Nor need it be considered at this time, how damages are tobe calculated in assessing
harm to the falsely accused plaintiff (e.g., from severed relationships).
296Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ohio 1993).
Consortium damages are generally awarded to a parent, if at all, only where the
injured child is a minor. In the present situation, where the wrong itself is directed at
any relationship between the adult patient and her parent, the recommendation is that
if a valuable relationship existed prior to the therapy, and the therapy creates a cause
of action under legal tests advanced herein, there should be recovery, notwithstanding
that the shattered relationship was one between a parent and an adult child. Of course,
to the extent that there was pre-therapy estrangement, damages should be reduced or,
where appropriate, entirely rejected.
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would reject the claim that the egregious evils done to innocent persons should
remain uncompensated.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether a jurisdiction that would not
find liability under its existing doctrinal schema might well conclude that
jurisprudential principles justify recognition of a duty in this situation, and in
effect, creation of a new tort.
While in some quarters there is almost automatic opposition to the
recognition of any new tort, such opposition is often generated by myths about
a litigation explosion, political opposition often fueled by insurance pay-out
considerations,297 influence of professional self-protective guilds, and
misleading anecdotes about frivolous tort-actions resulting in large and
irrational jury awards.
There are, admittedly, also serious and defensible scholarly concerns about
extending recovery rights to all who might suffer reasonably foreseeable harm.
This author does not contend that liability should extend to all who suffer
reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from a defendant's negligent
behavior. 298 Nevertheless, there are time-tested jurisprudential principles that
may well justify, in particular situations, the creation of new torts.
There is no universally accepted "objective" test for determining the
existence of a duty. While many courts simply beg the question by asserting
that a duty does or does not exist, the respected scholarly and judicial approach
would consider and balance a number of pertinent factors.299
A California Supreme Court decision, en banc, gave careful attention to
articulating factors relevant to recognition of a duty in our tort jurisprudence:
1) Foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; 2) degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; 3) the proximity of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; 4) the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct; 5) the policy of preventing future harm; 6) the extent of
the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and 7) the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 300
297Albeit with the public bearing part of the ultimate cost.
298As an anonymous observer said: "on a clear day some courts can foresee forever."
299 Prosser and Keeton speak of the defendant's moral blameworthiness, moral
aspects of the defendant's acts, administrative convenience, relative capacity of the
parties tobear the loss, and the policy of prevention of future injuries. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 263, at 359. The Restatement of Torts lists the objectives of tort liability as
compensation, determination of rights, vindication of parties, punishment of
wrongdoers and deterrence of wrongful conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 90
(1979).
30 0Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
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A. Foreseeability of Harm to Plaintiff
When a therapist uses heavy-handed suggestiveness, often in connection
with hypnosis, recklessly creating a false memory, or false belief that a
childhood figure sexually molested the patient as a child, it is surely
foreseeable-indeed more than a fair probability-that the patient will
confront the "molester" with an accusation, or at least tell other family members
of his/her belief. Regarding foreseeability, while in some cases the therapist
may have a particular individual in mind before engendering the false and firm
belief, in some situations the powerful suggestions of CSA will leave the patient
to supply the name of the "offender."
B. Degree of Certainty that Plaintiff Suffered Injury
It is virtually impossible to imagine a situation more certain to produce
injury than the accusation of a sexual crime committed against a child. The
injury is even more certain when: 1) the purported victim is one's own child
or close relative; and 2) that child or close relative, now an adult, is the one
leveling the accusation.
Personal emotional devastation, shattering of family ties, and the stigma of
being thought a moral cretin, are almost as certain as they are severe. Economic
damages, such as loss of employment, often follow as well.
C. Proximity of the Injury to the Conduct
Although the wrongly accused plaintiff is not physically present at the time
and place of generation of destructive pseudomemories, the destructive
consequences of false accusations are so highly probable that it can be
meaningfully concluded that the plaintiff is present in the immediate and
inevitable wake of the therapist's misconduct. In terms of proximity in time,
there are virtually no significant intervening steps between the patient's
infection with pathologically illusory memories of incestuous abuse and the
flinging of the inevitable accusation against the parent(s).
D. The Moral Blame Attached to the Defendant's Conduct
A psychotherapist who recklessly ignores historic truth and persuades a
patient that s/he was sexually violated as a child, without any support from
authoritatively accepted indicative symptoms, is engaging in morally
outrageous conduct toward the wrongly accused plaintiff. Indeed, such
conduct cannot, by any stretch of reason or any defensible notion of the idea
of "therapeutic," be justified as furthering or enhancing the patient's ultimate
emotional well-being. Public views reflected in the media, opinions by a wide
range of professional and academic experts, by community opinion leaders,
and by professional associations, strongly support the proposition that
recklessly generating false accusations of an odious crime against a child is
morally indefensible.
E. The Policy of Preventing Future Harm
Subjecting therapists to compensatory and, where appropriate, punitive
damages for recklessly engendering false accusations would inevitably reduce
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the future incidence of such conduct. As a matter of policy it is desirable to
inhibit such conduct. As in certain other areas of tort law, the imposition of
damages against grossly irresponsible professionals should operate as a
mechanism for quality control.
F. The Extent of the Burden to the Defendant and the Consequences to the
Community of Imposing Liability
Under the proposal herein, the defendant is left a wide range of practices,
even suggestive practices, for which no liability is authorized. Therapists can
"pick up" on patients' beliefs of prior sexual abuse or even partial but unaided
memories that they have been sexually abused, and even permit the patient to
opine or consider sources of her fragmentary memories. Where the patient
presents with no memories of sexual abuse, the therapist can invite
consideration of possibilities, as long as heavy handed suggestiveness is not
utilized.
Beyond that, in formulating the statutory proposal, this author was
concerned about avoiding a chilling effect on legitimate treatment of actual
abuse survivors, or indeed the danger of a legal regime that would deter
therapists from taking on adult patients who might have been victims of CSA.
Given the extensive degrees of freedom that the suggested test of liability
leaves to the therapist (see discussion below) it is submitted that the threat of
liability, limited to outrageous and grossly reckless or irresponsible behavior,
does not unduly burden a therapist legitimately practicing psychotherapy. It
would be most unlikely that imposing liability for reckless
hypersuggestiveness would reduce treatment of actual victims of incest.
In terms of the consequences to the community, consider first actual and
potential patients, including actual incest survivors. They will not be denied a
full and professional consideration of the sources, manifestations, behavioral
and/or psychological dynamics of their difficulties, or denied any number of
possibly effective remedial therapeutic strategies.
To the community, including the family of the patient, the consequences are
healthy, positive, and harm-avoiding. Family members should be substantially
less likely to be falsely accused of unspeakable wrongs, and much less likely
to be exposed to unwarranted emotional anguish and severance of life-long
ties. The authentic history of family relations will not be vulnerable to sabotage
by pathological revision. And the peace and tranquility of the whole
community would be less likely polluted by noxious and unwarranted
accusations of heinous sexual crimes committed against infants,30 1 toddlers,
and older children.
Such practices are manifestly unworthy of legal protection. They are not only
devastating to the wrongly accused and his family, but the very civility of
society itself is polluted by unfounded charges run rampant.
301 
"The claim is even made by recovery therapists that adults can be brought back to
the age of one or two years old and remember incidents of sexual abuse, a claim at
complete odds with serious scholarship on memory." Loftus, supra note 2, at 521.
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Justice Brandeis' observations in another context seem equally applicable
here: "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding."302
The therapeutic consultation room should not be converted into an
investigative adjunct of the nearest grand jury. The patient's emotional health,
sound functioning and freedom from distress, i.e., the best interests of the
patient, must be the professional therapist's only concern. Any other
pre-conceived agenda involves exploiting the patient or treating her as a
means, not an end in herself.303
XI. REASONS FOR PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Although the arguments presented above conclude that liability is
warranted under existing legal doctrines and that in any event, traditional
jurisprudential principles of torts justify judicial recognition of a duty here (i.e.,
a new tort), the most sensible and rational solution would be legislative. Absent
legislation addressing the problem of confidentiality, some courts might
decline to override it, even if the statutory and common law scheme in the state
permit overriding it, notwithstanding the extraordinary social policy
justifications presented here. A statute may be necessary in many states to
empower judges to consider confidential material in camera, and to require
disclosure only where s/he determines that a prima facie case of liability has
been made.
Moreover, statutory provisions can provide additional screening devices
that would tend to weed out specious claims that might otherwise disrupt an
ongoing valuable therapeutic process. Legislation can protect the therapeutic
processs against interference based on minor lapses of competence and
debatable (rather than gross) deviations from ordinary standards of care. It can
prevent a chilling effect that might inhibit treatment of actual survivors of CSA.
A statutory remedy can authoritatively identify the circumstances where most
of the abuses occur and leave other situations untouched.
Most significantly, legislation can empower and command an otherwise
ambivalent judiciary to effectuate justice by providing an authoritative remedy
for egregious inflictions of personal anguish and massive human losses.
302 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (J. Brandeis, dissent).
303This is not to say that Bowman and Mertz support strong suggestiveness in
therapy. Throughout their article, they make disapproving references to such practices,
maintaining however, (contrary to a thesis herein) that the prevalence or high frequency
of such practices has not been established. Bowman & Mertz, supra note 7.
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XII: AVOIDING A CHILLING EFFECT ON TREATMENT OF POSSIBLE
ABUSE-SURVIVORS
Because of the undesirability of creating: 1) a chilling effect on appropriate
treatment of actual survivors of CSA;304and 2) uncertainty on the part of
therapists as to where the line between safe and legally dangerous conduct
falls, several safeguards against these possibilities have been built into the
recommended legislation.
A. Leaving Room for Ordinary Error
It is not an appropriate function of the law to manage, let alone
micro-manage psychotherapy. The proposed remedy leaves room for some
carelessness on the part of the therapist in negligently eliciting illusory
memories of CSA. The law must allow a zone of risk and a zone of error, or
indefensibly risk a chilling effect on generally legitimate practices. Therapists
must be given room to breathe; room to fully explore the patient's psyche, room
to interpret, and even room to suggest, within a wide range of arguably
acceptable practices. 305
There are other areas of the law in which doctrines have been developed that
permit causes of action while recognizing that some leeway ought to be
permitted the defendant-that is, recognizing that there are values too important
and vulnerable to override by a simple test of negligence or ordinary incompetence.
A closely related example is where a therapist reports to authorities, as the
law requires,30 6 incidents that have come to his or her attention regarding
sexual abuse of a child. Under mandatory reporting laws, a therapist is immune
from liability as long as the report was made in good faith (or absent gross
negligence or recklessness). 307
When a public official or public figure brings a defamation action, the first
amendment requires proof that the falsehood was deliberate or published in
304 Seegenerally Paul S. Applebaum, M.D. & Rosey Zoltec-Jick, Psychotherapists' Duties
to Third Parties: Ramona and Beyond, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 457, 461-62 (1996).
305 See Yamini, supra note 7, at 577-79. For example, in a discussion of the requirements
for prevailing in a malicious prosecution suit, Prosser and Keeton observe,
[tihe law supports the use of litigation as a social means for resolving
disputes, and it encourages honest citizens to bring criminals to
justice. Consequently the accuser must be given a large degree of
freedom to make mistakes and misjudgments without being subject
to liability.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 263, at 871.
306 0n immunity for ordinary negligence in reporting sexual abuse of a child, see, e.g.,
Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P. 2d 285, 288 (1988). Regarding the duty of a therapist to
report to authorities information about a sexually abused child, see generally, Steven R.
Smith, Mental Health Malpractice In The 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REV. 209, 250-52 (1991).
307Recent cases suggest that courts have been interpreting requirements of bad faith
or gross negligence loosely, and that in fact, therapists have been held liable for mere
negligence in reporting.
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reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.308 This doctrine is designed to give
breathing room to a significant social and political enterprise-i.e., critical
expression regarding government officials or important public personages.
Without such a requirement, the law of libel would have a chilling effect on
constitutionally protected activity.
A malicious prosecution suit to succeed must establish that the allegations
in the original suit were brought in bad faith and without probable cause. 309
"Good Samaritan" laws often provide that where a person who is not legally
obliged to rescue another person does in fact attempt to render aid to one in
peril, the would-be rescuer is not liable for ordinary negligence in the effort to
assist. The plaintiff must show that the defendant-samaritan was grossly
negligent or reckless in the manner of rendering aid.310
In each situation,311 although the underlying activity has proximately
caused harm, for various social reasons protective of the activity itself, damages
can be recovered only where the activity is performed in a grossly negligent or
reckless way.
That recklessly instilling false memories of CSA should be a tort for which a
non-patient can recover has already been maintained in arguments above. The
requirement of recklessness assures that indeed the tort, as committed, is an
outrageous wrong.
308New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
309The requirement of both malice and the absence of probable cause is set out in
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 263, at 871. In the sense of improper motive, see id. at
883-84. "[T]he requirement in malicious prosecution cases that the defendant must act
without probable cause may well meet the constitutional requirements [if the
requirements in libel cases apply] that [the defendant] act recklessly in disregard of the
truth." Id. at 885.
310 See, e.g., Moyer v. Grier, No. CIV.A. 89C-MR-90, 1989 WL 167405, *5 (Del. Super.
Dec. 27, 1989) (Under Delaware's "good Samaritan" statute, a person voluntarily
rendering emergency care is not liable for damages resulting from that care unless his
conduct was willful, wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 6801
(1996)); Tatum v. Gigliotti, 565 A.2d 354 (Md. Ct. App. 1989), affd, 583 A.2d 1602 (Md.
1991); Theodore Eugene Jobst v. Butler Well Servicing, Inc., 372 P.2d 55 (Kan. 1977).
Similar protections against liability for ordinary negligence are provided in the few
states that impose criminal or quasi-criminal penalties for failure to rescue. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 604.05 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (b)(1973).
311 To prevail in a civil rights action against a public official or police officer requires
a showing of bad faith, mere negligence is not sufficient. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Fort
Wayne, Ind., 591 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Madison v. Manter, 441 F.2d 537, (1st
Cir. 1971); Reese v. York, 571 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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B. Desirability of a Bright Line Rule
To maximize predictability and avoid the necessity of litigating every case
from scratch, a doctrine which creates or recognizes bright line rules is
desirable.312
Professor David Wexler takes the view that any rule imposing liability on
psychotherapists should encompass a readily discernible triggering point, or
bright line, so that a therapist can easily recognize when s/he is in (legally and
professionally) dangerous territory. In discussing both Tarasoff and Ramona
type cases, Wexler states:
In the Tarasoff area,... the intrusion on therapy may be markedly
reduced if, as is the law in some jurisdictions, the duty to protect a third
party is triggered only by a patient's specific threat against an
identified or clearly identifiable victim. In such "crystallized trigger"
jurisdictions, a therapist can basically put legal worries to one side and merely
practice psychotherapy, unless and until the duty to protect is rather
clearly triggered by the patient making the required threat. Perhaps
therapists will, during therapy sessions, be able to relax more about
Ramona liability if future courts construe the direct victim duty to be
triggered only when a therapist makes to a patient a specific suggestion
relating to an identified or clearly identifiable 
third person.31f t
This author agrees with the importance of having a fairly clear line of
demarcation between liability-endangeringbehavior and legally safe practices.
That line, embodied in the proposed legislation below is where the therapist,
treating a patient who has presented with no memories of CSA, uses
hypersuggestive techniques with suggestive content in treating the patient.
Under the proposed statute, a therapist would not need to concern herself
about liability in the following situations:
a) where s/he was treating a patient who presented with at least
some suspicion or memory that she had been sexually abused in her
childhood.
b) where the therapist did not employ hypersuggestive techniques
with a patient who presented with no verbalized suspicions or
memories of being victimized by sexual abuse in her childhood.
312See, e.g., Bowman & Mertz, supra note 7, at 594-96. They hypothetically compare a
bright line limiting standing to sue to family members, and a bright line simply
forbidding third party suits against therapists for allegedly inducing false memories.
To this author, the first bright line is a red herring, because it would have little or no
tendency to make readily discernible the practices that are forbidden under given
circumstances. (They find other reasons to reject their own hypothesized bright line and
prefer prohibition of the lawsuits altogether.)
313David Wexler, Editorial, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Clinical Practice, 153 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 453, 454 (1996).
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c) where the therapist may have employed a technique that might
ordinarily be considered hypersuggestive, with a patient presenting
with no memory of CSA, but the therapist did not actually suggest,
directly or indirectly, (prior to the patient's raising it) the possibility of
CSA.
To put it otherwise, there would be no reason to fear liability where the
patient presented with no memories, where the therapists refrained from
hypersuggestive techniques, or where the therapist refrained from remarks
regarding CSA in using otherwise hypersuggestive techniques.
XIII. PROPOSED STATUTE
A. Liability of a therapist-defendant under this statute is limited
to situations where the memory or belief results in an
accusation of childhood sexual abuse against plaintiff made by
the therapist or the patient.
B. This statute is not intended to apply where the patient, prior
to initiation of the present cause of action, has initiated a legal
action in a court of law against the alleged abuser, based on
claimed abuse, which action is presently pending.
C. This statute is not intended to apply where a patient always
remembered having been sexually abused or manifested at or
near the commencement of the therapeutic relationship and
absent suggestive techniques employed by defendant, an
autonomous and unambiguous recall of being victimized by
childhood sexual abuse.
D. (1) A therapist shall be liable to a person accused by a patient
or the therapist of childhood sexual abuse where the plaintiff
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
a) by the techniques employed and the statements
made, the therapist was either
i) reckless regarding, or
ii) consciously risking or willfully blind to, his or
her creation of a substantial probability that any
'recovered memories" of childhood sexual abuse
purportedly perpetrated by the plaintiff would be
illusory and
b) the memories and accusations engendered by
violation of D(1)(a) proximately caused plaintiff
emotional damages and/or familial harms and/or
reputational harms of a severe nature.
(2) Where Part D(1) is violated,
a) the illusory nature of the memory and the falsity of
the accusations shall be rebuttably presumed and need
not be established by the plaintiff;
b) the causal connection between the illusory memories
and the false accusations shall be irrebutably presumed.
E. It is "reckless," within the meaning of Part D(1)(a) to use
techniques and statements so unduly suggestive or persuasive
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as to be highly conducive to the production in the mind of the
patient of an illusory memory or belief that s/he was a victim
of childhood sexual abuse perpetrated by the plaintiff.
F. (1) Techniques which shall not be insufficient as a matter of
law, to permit a factfinder to consider whether they are so
unduly suggestive or persuasive as to be highly conducive to
the production in the patient's mind of an illusory memory or
belief that s/he was a victim of childhood sexual abuse by the
plaintiff, include, but are not limited to:
a) hypnosis accompanied by communications tending
to induce, generate, or create illusory thoughts, beliefs,
visual images, or memories of childhood sexual abuse;
b) drug-induced altered state of consciousness
accompanied by communications tending to induce,
generate, or create illusory thoughts, beliefs, visual
images, or memories of childhood sexual abuse;
c) guided imagery accompanied by communications
tending to induce, generate, or create illusory thoughts,
beliefs, visual images, or memories of childhood sexual
abuse; or
d) placement of the patient in a "support" group prior to
any "acknowledgement" by the patient that he or she has
suffered childhood sexual abuse, where a significant
activity of such group involves persuasion of various
members that they were in fact victims of such abuse.
G. If "the patient" is actively defendant's patient at the time of the
suit, the plaintiff must make a showing in camera, prior to filing
the complaint and prior to discovery proceedings, that existing
evidence would satisfy the burden of production in the
contemplated litigation. For this purpose hearsay evidence is
admissible.
H. (1) Plaintiff must submit at the time of filing the complaint, and
prior to discovery proceedings, certificates of merit executed
by:
a) the attorney for the plaintiff; and
b) by a licensed clinical psychologist or licensed
psychiatrist selected by the plaintiff declaring,
respectively, that:
i) the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, as
known; that the attorney has consulted with at least
one clinical psychologist or psychiatrist whom the
attorney has made knowledgeable of the facts of the
case as known, and whom the attorney reasonably
believes is knowledgeable regarding the
requirements of Parts D, E, and F of the statute and
that the attorney has concluded on the basis of that
review and consultation that there is reasonable and
meritorious cause for the filing of the action;
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ii) the consulted mental health practitioner is
licensed to practice and practices in this state either
clinical psychology or psychiatry and is not a party
to the action;
iii) the practitioner is not treating and has not
treated the "patient," and that the practitioner is
knowledgeable of the facts of the case as known, and
has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge,
that in his or her professional opinion defendant has
probably utilized techniques that were reckless
regarding, consciously risking, or willfully blind to,
a substantial likelihood that any ostensible
'recovered memories" of childhood sexual abuse
would be illusory.
2) A complaint under this statute may not be served upon
the defendant, nor may discovery processes commence,
until the court has reviewed the materials required by
Parts G and H(1) herein, and has found, in camera, that
there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of
the action. At that time, the complaint may be served
upon the defendant. The duty to serve the defendant with
process shall not attach until that time.
3) A violation of Part H(1) may constitute unprofessional
conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the
attorney.
I. If the court finds, on the basis of the showing in Part G and/or
Part H, that the necessary showing has been made to permit
the case to go forward, then on appropriate motions, the court
must consider, in camera, any discovery requests for otherwise
confidential communications, information or records, and
further be advised of any such communications, information
or records which are requested that defendant seeks to protect
from disclosure, prior to requiring such material to be released
to plaintiff.
The court, after reviewing these matters in camera, shall authorize
only that extent of disclosure that arguably indicates:
a) the patient's relevant beliefs or lack of beliefs prior to
the therapy; and
b) that unduly suggestive techniques were utilized in
the course of the therapy, and probably contributed
substantially to the patient's memory or belief of an act or
acts of sexual abuse committed by plaintiff against the
patient during the patient's childhood.
Prior to any release of records, the court shall announce its intention
to order particular disclosures and permit the parties to make
appropriate motions and arguments.
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J. Where plaintiff has met the burden required by Part D of this
statute, the jury must find in favor of the plaintiff, unless the
defendant establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the
plaintiff did in fact sexually abuse the patient; provided that
the defendant may not introduce, as evidence toward
satisfying this burden, any statements of apparent recovered
memory made by the patient absent sufficient corroborating
evidence to reasonably raise the issue for the finder of fact.
K. Recovery shall include compensation for injury (where
present) to reputation and for loss of consortium, if any;
severance of family ties; emotional distress; and any tangible
monetary losses (including but not limited to, lost
employment, sick days, medical expenses), and, where
established that the tort was intentionally committed, punitive
damages.
XIV. COMMENTARY ON PROPOSED STATUTE
Re: ParA.
There is liability only where an accusation of childhood sexual abuse is
made. There is no liability, under this statute for instilling the memory or belief
as such, although that may well be malpractice.
Re: PatB.
Because of the undesirability of having two lawsuits involving very similar
claims and functionally similar parties, the proposed remedy should not be
available while a lawsuit brought by the adult patient against the parent is
pending. Moreover, claims made in such a lawsuit have a qualified immunity
from becoming the basis of another suit, at least unless and until the claims are
rejected by a court or fact-finder. Indeed for an accused person to subsequently
base a lawsuit on the accusations embodied in the patient's suit would require
a showing of bad faith in a malicious prosecution suit.
Re: Part C.
While it is possible that a therapist: a) incompetently accepted a presenting
assertion by a patient that she was an incest victim; and/or b) inappropriately
and unprofessionally transformed a fragmentary memory of mild or moderate
abuse into a full and illusory memory of severe abuse, it is submitted that a
statute ought to draw a fairly bright line as to vulnerability to liability.
Moreover, in view of the possibility of spontaneous, independent, and
reasonable accurate recollections of deeply buried traumas, it would be
appropriate to assure therapists of immunity to a suit where the patient
presents with all or part of such recovered memory.
Re: Part Q(1).
The key to the proposed cause of action is the creation by the therapist of a
substantial risk of inducing illusory memories. The forbidden practices are akin to
reckless endangerment of false memory creation. The statute, in effect, creates
a rebuttable presumption that the elicited memory is false where
hypersuggestive techniques are used. In making the determination under Part
D(1), a court or jury would consider, to the degree provable, even by hearsay,
the nature of the techniques employed to enhance "recovery" of memory.
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(It should not be necessary to make any determinations whether the abuse
sought to be uncovered was thought by the therapist to be profoundly
forgotten or psychologically repressed.)
Re: Part D(3).
As in almost all tort litigation, it must be shown that the wrong proximately
caused the harm. In rare cases this requirement might not be met. (E.g., where,
without contribution from any memories induced in therapy, the patient
acquires the belief or knowledge independently that the plaintiff molested her
as a child, and her accusations flow from that independent source.)
Also, there might be circumstances where it was not reasonably foreseeable
to the therapist that accusations would be made against the plaintiff (e.g., the
therapist might have reasonably believed that the molester was deceased).
Additionally, other adult children of the plaintiff may have made accusations
of child molestation, in which case, even if the patient's accusation is false and
culpably engendered by the therapist, the amount of harm caused by the
therapist's actions might be negligible.
Re: Part E.
This section defines a key term in the operational section (D)(1)(a), the term
reckless." Consistent with the emphasis in this Article, the conduct that
justifies litigation and recovery is the use of extremely suggestive techniques
that strongly tend to induce or implant pseudomemories of childhood sexual
abuse. When such techniques are used with a patient that had no such
memories prior to therapy, it is justified to effectively adopt a rebuttable
presumption that the memories are culpably iatrogenic (caused by the
treatment) and that the accusations they produced are false. The rebuttable
nature of the presumption that the accusations are false is indicated by section
J.
Re: Part F.
This Part sets out some of the most flagrantly suggestive techniques and
provides that where any of these are established plaintiff's case should be
treated as sufficiently weighty to overcome a motion to dismiss-i.e., a motion
based on the claim that a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff under
Part D(1) on the basis of the evidence presented. The fact that one or more of
the factors listed in this Part are found, does not, of course, require the jury to
conclude that there is liability.
Re: Part G.
This provision is designed to avoid or minimize the possibility of certain
undesirable results, identified and amplified by Professors Bowman and
Mertz: i.e., unnecessary or inappropriate interference with ongoing therapy.
Since, however, the required showing must be made before, and as a condition
to, commencement of discovery proceedings, all or most of the available
evidence at this point would probably be in hearsay form.
Re: Part H.
This screening device is somewhat less onerous for the plaintiff and the
judge, requiring a certification of merit by counsel and a licensed clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist. This section applies where the suit is brought at a
time the "patient" is no longer a patient of the defendant. While in this situation
there is not the risk of interfering with ongoing therapy, there is nevertheless a
risk of unjustifiably subjecting both the therapist and the former patient to a
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lawsuit that may expose significant aspects of otherwise confidential
information, re-victimize an actual victim, and target an ordinarily and socially
valuable relationship.
The principal protections are, of course, the ultimate proof requirements in
Part D(1).
Re: Part I.
In order to avoid unnecessary and unjustified disclosures of confidential
communications, this Part requires that the court, where it has found that the
requirements of Parts G and/or H have been met, review in camera any
discovery requests for confidential matters, and any particular information or
records requested. Only where and to the extent that the court finds that
confidential matters are arguably relevant to the proof required to establish
liability should it require disclosure.
There is precedent for this approach under the Tarasoff doctrine. In a suit
alleging a breach of a psychiatrist's duty to protect a victim against a threatened
danger by a patient, the California Court of Appeals held that the trial court
appropriately first considered the requested, otherwise-privileged,
information in camera, and where a prima facie case of violation of duty was
made out, ordered disclosure of such records.314
It is important that the court, in fashioning its ultimate discovery rulings,
protect confidential therapeutic communications to the greatest extent
consistent with permitting a plaintiff (who has overcome initial screening
hurdles) to have a fair opportunity to establish that the accusations against him
of sexually molesting a child were produced by highly suggestive and
unprofessional techniques.
It has been argued (not without dissent) that confidentiality is a sine qua non
to successful psychotherapy. There is much to suggest that trust is a vital
element in successful psychotherapy. Trust is essential to any therapeutic
alliance, to the process of unfettered emotional disclosure, and to believing in
the therapist's unalloyed concern for the patient's emotional/behavioral
well-being. Trust is essential to any fortified hope in the mind of the patient
that relief from psychic distress, constructive behavioral change, and personal
and interpersonal growth can eventually emerge from the therapeutic process.
The possibility of public disclosure of the therapeutic process may
undermine trust, yet, as seen, at times there are powerful countervailing values.
Under the proposal, disclosure comes about where there is a high probability
that the therapist betrayed the patient's trust by acting out of motives or beliefs
that ignored and jeopardized the patient's best therapeutic interests.
Re: Farti.
A therapist ought not to be liable to an accused person if in fact the plaintiff
did abuse the patient. It would be outrageous if an actual molester could
disrupt therapy and recover from a therapist even if the patient's memory was
engendered by irresponsibly suggestive techniques.
314Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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Thus, if the therapist can introduce corroborating evidence, that, together
with the patient's memory of abuse, establishes such abuse by a preponderance
of the evidence, the defendant-therapist should prevail in the lawsuit.
The corroborating evidence element might be met or partially met by
testimony by a member of the family or other person who witnessed the abuse,
from siblings who were also abused, from photographs, diaries, or school,
hospital, police, or social welfare records.3 15
XV. SOME EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
In order to meet screening requirements, hearsay evidence will suffice. In
most cases where the patient is still in therapy with the defendant, the plaintiff
will have to rely on statements by the patient, to other relatives, to the plaintiff,
and to her friends, regarding matters taken up in therapy. (It is possible that
before any memories have been induced, the patient had mentioned to the
ultimately accused abuser, something about the methodology.) It may be
possible to learn enough about the defendant's techniques from other
therapists familiar with such techniques, or from the defendant himself (who
may give public talks, lectures, or interviews, or have published writings). (The
ethics of employing a covert detective to pose as a patient involve issues
obviously beyond the scope of this Article.)
It should not be sufficient (to satisfy screening requirements) for plaintiff to
prove that no accusations were made prior to the patient's initiation of therapy
with the defendant.
315See generally Matthew J. Eisenberg, Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood
Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 249, 278 (1995).

